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ARTICLE
Jeffrey W Stempel
Legal Ethics and Law Reform Advocacy
Abstract. Social activism, particularly law reform, has long been an
accepted, even revered part of the lawyer's identity. However, modern
developments such as nation-wide firms, the economic importance of client
development, and aggressive attempts by clients to deploy attorneys as de facto,
undisclosed lobbyists have put substantial pressure on the traditional vision of
the attorney as a "lawyer-statesman" or someone who "checks clients at the
door" when participating in law reform activities. Furthermore, law reform
activism on behalf of one client (or prospective client when attorneys use their
law reform lobbying as part of their marketing strategy) poses a real danger of
injury to other law firm clients. The latter may lose cases influenced by
Restatements, Model Acts, Committee Reports, or White Papers produced by
law reform organizations.
Law reform organizations have paid insufficient attention to the problem of
the partisan participant, and the legal profession has failed to sufficiently
appreciate the positional and institutional conflicts created when lawyers engage
in politico-legal activism on behalf of clients. Both problems undermine the
lawyer-statesman ideal and create impermissible positional conflicts of interest
disserving clients.
Lobbying surrounding the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law
of Liability Insurance (RLLI) exemplifies both problems and the profession's
insufficient response to date. Recognition and appreciation of the problem
demonstrate the need for a new regime of increased disclosure (to clients, law
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reform organizations, and the public), scrutiny, and enforcement of neutrality
and conflict norms. If properly observed, a heightened appreciation of the
problem would likely require lawyers and firms to decline certain engagements
or at least obtain the consent of those potentially adversely affected.
Author. Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Bill Boyd, Dan
Hamilton, Ted Lee, David McClure, and Ann McGinley and to Vince Johnson,
Journal staff, and Symposium organizers as well as to my ALI colleagues and
RLLI Advisers, including those in disagreement with this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since perhaps even before the founding of the United States, the legal
profession has participated in politics, public policy, and "the law," narrowly
defined. In Democragy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that in the
U.S., nearly every political question tended to become a legal matter
eventually.' Although perhaps not strictly empirically accurate,
de Tocqueville's observation summarizes well the degree of involvement
traditionally exercised by lawyers in America's polity. Many presidents have
been attorneys,2 as have a large number of federal, state, and local
1. Or, more completely:
There is hardly any political question in the United States that sooner or later does not turn into
a judicial question. From that, the obligation that the parties find in their daily polemics to borrow
ideas and language from the judicial system. Since most public men are or have formerly been
jurists, they make the habits and the turn of ideas that belong to jurists pass into the handling of
public affairs. The jury ends up by familiarizing all classes with them. Thus, judicial language
becomes, in a way, the common language; so the spirit of the jurist, born inside the schools and
courtrooms, spreads little by little beyond their confines; it infiltrates all of society, so to speak; it
descends to the lowest ranks, and the entire people finishes by acquiring a part of the habits and
tastes of the magistrate.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 441 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer
trans., Liberty Fund 2010) (1835).
2. Although only six presidents have formal J.D. degrees-Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt
(Columbia), Richard Nixon (Duke), Barack Obama (Harvard), Gerald Ford and Bill Clinton (Yale)-
many other have some form of law degree (e.g., the Bachelor of Laws of William Howard Taft, who
was ChiefJustice) with others (most famously Abraham Lincoln) having at least studied or read law
and practiced as attorneys. Other lawyer-presidents include John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James
Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, John Tyler, James Polk, Millard
Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Rutherford B. Hayes, Chester Arthur, Grover Cleveland,
Benjamin Harrison, William McKinley, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Calvin Coolidge, and
Harry Truman. See Chelsea Beran, Before The Were Presidents ... They Were Lajers, L. TECH. TODAY
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officeholders, despite some decline in recent years. Lawyers continue to
heavily populate the ranks of lobbyists, political operatives, and
sociopolitical activists. But even if the fabled lawyer-statesman 5 is not as
predominant as was once the case, the activist lawyer remains an important
part of public policymaking.
In the two centuries since de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America,
changes in the practice of law and the politics of law reform have combined
to change the manner in which lawyer activism takes place, arguably
increasing lawyer conflict of interest and infidelity to the cause of law
reform. Lawyers today seldom engage in solo practice confined to a
particular locality.' Increasingly, law practice takes place in large, multi-
office firms, a business model more likely to make one segment of the firm
unaware of the clients and work of other segments of the firm despite
modern conflicts-checking software.7
Even when counsel notes actual or potential conflicts, the increasingly
profit-driven orientation of modern law practice may lead counsel to
minimize them and forge ahead without client consent in the interests of
maximizing revenue and in the belief that observed tensions in client interest
do not rise to the level of an actual conflict. This practice is a particular
(Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2016/02/before-they-were-presidents-they-
were-lawyers [https://perma.cc/US8N-U7Z3].
3. SeeJeffrey W. Stempel, Laers, Democracy andDisute Resolution: The Declining Influence ofLaer-
Statesmen Politicians and Lanyerly Values, 5 NEV. L.J. 479, 480-88 (2004) (describing the declining
influence lawyers have in politics).
4. The decline of lawyer representation in state legislatures has been particularly pronounced.
Disturbingly so for those of us who think lawyers are generally good analysts and valuable additions to
a deliberative political body. Fifty years ago, it appears a third or more of many state legislators were
attorneys. By the 21st Century, it was unusual to have legislatures where more than a fifth of the
members were lawyers. See id. at 484-85 (providing the percentage of attorney-legislatures in some
states over several decades).
5. I use the term both because it has been popularized by Tony Kronman and because it serves
as a shorthand reference for describing attorneys involved in public policy issues and public service.
See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993). I use the term as coined despite its arguable gender bias.
6. See David Thomas, Bi La Has Saturated the Biggest U.S. Cities. Where Is the Next Frontier?,
LAW.COM (March 2, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2020/03/02/big-law-
has-saturated-the-biggest-u-s-cities-where-is-the-next-frontier/ [https://perma.cc/54E6-YPK8]
(observing how Big Law firms are expanding into secondarylegalmarkets uch as Phoenix, San Diego,
Nashville, Las Vegas, and others by merging with smaller local firms).
7. See id. ('To say the legal business in the United States is only in New York or California or
Chicago or Washington ... is simply false and misunderstands the breadth of how legal business is
done, both inbound and outbound,' [Denton's U.S. CEO Mike] McNamara says. 'It is a far too limited
view of where companies are spending on legal services."').
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danger when the arguable conflict occurs not in litigation but in what may
broadly be labeled "law reform" activity.
By law reform activity, I mean the work of organizations seeking to
improve the law either through clarification or revision. Examples of law
reform organizations include local, 8 state, and national bar associations such
as the ABA,' as well as national organizations such as the ALPo and
NCUSL." These are what might be termed "pure" law reform
organizations widely regarded as neutral, non-partisan, and reliable.
Although attorney organizations such as the AAJ 2 and DRI" often
provide useful information and analysis, they are at bottom advocacy groups
that view legal issues from a, particularly, avowed perspective. Similarly,
8. For example, the New York City Bar Association, formally known as the Association of the
City of the Bar of New York (ABCNY) regularly produces extensive committee reports and
recommendations regarding legal doctrine and proposed changes in legislation and regulation. About,
N.Y.C. B., https://www.nycbar.org/about [https://perma.cc/RHT5-R6LB]. It may be a bit
misleading to describe the bar association of one of the world's largest and most influential cities (in
which it has its own Midtown headquarters) as "local," but similar activity is found on a reduced scale
in cities throughout the U.S.
9. The American Bar Association regularly produces and revises model codes and model rules
to govern the conduct of lawyers and judges, something it has done since the ABA Canons of Ethics
were promulgated in 1908. See, e.g., ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct; ABA Model Rules of
Judicial Conduct; ABA Standards Regarding Lawyer Discipline. See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct,
AM. BAR. ASS'N., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/m
odelrules oLprofessionalconduct/ [https://perma.cc/HZ4K-8TDC].
10. The American Law Institute regularly produces Restatements of the Law and Principles of
the Law that set forth suggested "correct" doctrine to guide courts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
RESTITUTION (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). See also HowALl Works,
AM. LAW. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/ [https://perma.cc/A7KA-
PXBX].
11. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, also known as the
Uniform Law Commission, regularly produces model acts that it then presents to state legislators,
urging enactment. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code; Uniform Arbitration Act. See Overien,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview
[https://perma.cc/44AP-F6CF].
12. The American Association for Justice, formerly the American Trial Lawyers Association, is
an organization of plaintiffs' counsel committed to advancing the cause of personal injury plaintiffs.
See Mission & Histoy, AM. ASS'N FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/who-we-are/mission-history
[https://perma.cc/87Q3-GGD4].
13. The Defense Research Institute is an organization of defense counsel that includes attorneys
who regularly defend claims against policyholders (often referred to as "panel counsel" as the attorneys
are on an insurer's approved panel of attorneys for retention as defense counsel) and who regularly
represent insurers in cases involving insurance coverage. See About Us, DEF. RES. INST.,
https://www.dri.org/about/about-us [https://perma.cc/S67X-4FY9].
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organizations such as the ACA," the Federalist Society,'" the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights,' 6 and even the sometimes shrill ATRA" often
have valuable things to say-but such groups have a pronounced political
slant that differentiates them from the classic good government or law
reform organizations.
Although they are widely respected, I am placing organizations such as
the ACLU,' 8 the NRDC,'9 the EDF,2 0 and "think tank" organizations such
14. The American Constitution Association is a group of "progressive" lawyers whose goals
generally include expansion of the legal rights of individuals vis-a-vis business entities and a more
expansive role for government in the protection of individual rights and expanded government
regulation. SeeAboutACS, AM. CONST. SOC'Y, http://www.acslaw.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
AG67-4YDD].
15. The Federalist Society is a group of "conservative" lawyers whose goals generally include
protection of commercial activity, reduced liability and damages, constrained government regulation,
and expanded executive powers. See Our Background, FEDERALIST SOC'Y, https://fedsoc.org/our-
background [https://perma.cc/3LCE-WZAT].
16. The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law is a civil rights organization with the
avowed mission of seeking to secure equal justice under law for all through the rule of law by enlisting
the aid of the private bar in litigation, with a particular focus of aiding African-Americans. See Mission,
LAW. COMMITTEE FOR C.R. UNDER L., https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/mission/
[https://perma.cc/QVR8-V4EN].
17. The American Tort Reform Association lobbies for "tort reform," which in practice tends
to mean lobbying for restricted tort liability. Among its activities is a yearly naming of "Judicial
Hellholes"-jurisdictions regarded by ATRA as unduly pro-plaintiff. SeeJukciaHeholesAbuse Nation's
CiliJustice System, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N (Dec. 10, 2019), http://www.atra.org/2019/12/10/judi
cial-hellholes-abuse-nations-civil-justice-system [https://perma.cc/P4EG-QXPK] (naming in its list
of ten such "hellholes" California, Georgia, Louisiana, and Oklahoma). The American Legislative
Exchange Council, or ALEC, operates in a similar ideological vein, promoting legislation favored by
political conservatives. Its motto is "limited government, free markets and federalism." See About
ALEC, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNS., https://www.alec.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/H5MU-
WNGK].
18. The American Civil Liberties Union, or ACLU,is a nonprofit organization founded in 1920
"to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties" guaranteed to every person in the U.S.
according to the Constitution and laws of the U.S. It is popularly known as an organization
emphasizing free speech. See About the ACLU, AM. C.L. UNION, http://www.aclu.org/about-aclu
[https://perma.cc/3K5Q-2EWL] (discussing the purpose of the ACLU).
19. The National Resources Defense Council, or NRDC, is an environmental activist group
known for bringing litigation as a primary tool for promoting environmental protection. SeeAboutUs,
NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/about [https://perma.cc/6T4Z-4JZA].
20. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) is an environmental organization similar to the
NRDC, see sura text accompanying note 19, but one known more for lobbying and position papers
and less for litigation as compared to the NRDC. See Our Mission and Values, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/our-mission-and-values [https://perma.cc/LQ89-2VEY].
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as the Heritage Foundation2  and the Cato Institute2 2 into the interest
group category. The Brookings Institution2 3 and the Rand Corporation2 4
often impact public policy but are better described as think tanks rather than
as law reform organizations per se. Although both are less partisan, or
agenda-driven than other advocacy groups, they are not really membership
organizations in the same category as the ALI, the ABA, or other bar
associations.
In this Article, I will focus primarily on the pure or flagship law reform
organizations. It is those organizations about which I am concerned, and it
is those organizations that should be most concerned should their members
participate in organization activities in order to serve or attract clients, rather
than providing their best legal and policy analysis, unburdened by client
interests or the prospect of pecuniary gain.
By contrast, what might be termed the "interest group" law reform
organizations are generally identified as advocacy groups, and their work is
evaluated through a prism of their avowed goals and perhaps even palpable
partisanship. A DRI or AAJ position paper or lobbying effort may prove
persuasive-but not because informed readers view it as coming from a
neutral source or a consensus-building and balanced organization.
Although the "brand" of these organizations may have a powerful signaling
effect to their constituents, judges and policymakers are generally on notice
of (and presumably on guard about) their partisanship.
The work of the pure law reform organization comes with an aura of
authority, reliability, fairness, neutrality, and accuracy that interest group law
21. The Heritage Foundation is a conservative research group known for promoting
conservative public policy. See HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/ [https://perma.cc/
8DB7-U3MB] ("We are ramping up our efforts to get [Republican leadership] conservative policy
solutions that will shrink the size of government, reform the tax code, dismantle Obamacare, and
secure our borders.").
22. About Cato, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/about [https://perma.cc/G73X-TRP5].
The Cato Institute is a libertarian think tank founded by, among others, Charles Koch. Koch is the
CEO of energy conglomerate Koch Industries and is known for promoting limited government. See
Peter Bondarenko, Cato Insitute, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cato-
Institute [https://perma.cc/5EEP-FLKC].
23. The Brookings Institution is a research group, founded in 1916, known for economic
analysis and promotion of moderate to liberal public policy. About Us, BROOKINGS INST.,
https://www.brookings.edu/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/4M5A-URB9].
24. The Rand Corporation is a nonprofit research organization initially created and funded by
Douglas Aircraft Company to offer research and analysis to the U.S. armed forces. The group is viewed
as tending to favor moderate to liberal public policy. HistoU and Mission, RAND CORP.,
https://www.rand.org/about/history.htmnl[https://perma.cc/3JQ9-L9PW1.
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reform organizations cannot claim. Historically, the work of the pure
organizations is more likely to result in applicable law, through the
enactment of model statues and model rules or the adoption of the
organization's suggested legal doctrine by courts.
Consequently, lawyer input regarding the work of these organizations
must be as free as feasibly possible of partisanship on behalf of a lawyer's
clients or self-interest. An ABA Model Rule or ALI Restatement section
resulting from a member's2  successful lobbying on behalf of a client or
25. Lobbying activities by non-members is also problematic, as are non-member efforts to
subvert the neutrality of the law reform organization's work and work product. See Elizabeth Laposata,
et al., Tobacco Industy Influence on the American Lay Institute's Restatements of Torts and Implicationsfor Its
Conflict ofInterest Policies, 98 IOA L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2012) (explaining counsel attempted, with some
success, to influence the content ofRESTATEMENT (SECOND),TORTS 402A by submitting position
papers and letter briefs and by employing Restatement Reporters as consultants and expert witnesses).
But see Lance Liebman & Roberta Cooper Romo, The ALI's Response to the Centerfor Tobacco Control
Research Edcation, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1, 1-2 (2013) (taking issue with assertion and defending
ALI process); Keith N. Hylton, Lobbying and the Restatement of Torts, JOTWELL (Apr. 3, 2013),
https://torts.jotwell.com/lobbying-and-the-restatement-of-torts/ [https://perma.cc/LW5E-KG9V]
(reviewing Laposata, finding argument that Restatement Reporter William Wade Prosser "caved in to
tobacco lobbyists unpersuasive" but conceding that "[t]he Restatement process is vulnerable to
lobbying."). See also ROBERT PROCTOR, GOLDEN HOLOCAUST: ORIGINS OF THE CIGARETTE
CATASTROPHE AND THE CASE FOR ABOLITION 305-39 (2012) (chronicling long-term tobacco
industry efforts to obscure the dangers of smoking; ALI episode discussed at pages 332-34).
Although one may question whether the pure law reform organizations are sufficiently
governmental to be subject to First Amendment doctrine, the strong free speech norms of the U.S.
make it unlikely any of these organizations would refuse to consider commentary by non-members,
which would probably be bad policy as well. I say probably because it is not altogether clear the
additionalinformation received from partisan organizations outweighs the misleading information they
provide and the political pressure they place on members of the law reform organization.
As an example of the latter concern, consider a lawyer official of a law reform organization (e.g.,
an ALI Council member) who is a member of a law firm that does significant work for a corporate
client. In addition to lobbying for the ALI-either itself or through a law firm, which is a particular
problem if it is the Council member's law firm (more on this later in the Article)-the client may
threaten the Councilmember's law firm with loss ofbusiness unless the Council member supports the
client's position regarding particular Restatement positions. Although t e Laposata, et al. article does
not disclose such "billing mail" by Big Tobacco, it would not be farfetched to think that some of this
may have occurred as part of Big Tobacco's overall full-court press to make 402A less of a threat to
the industry.
All this said, non-member lobbying of a decision-making body (e.g., Congress, ALI, a bar
association) is a longstanding tradition that probably should not be terminated because the partisan
information is normally filtered through the decision-maker's understanding ofthe goals of the partisan
organization. By contrast, member efforts to influence the member's organization are generally viewed
as being sincere, neutral and without guile. Consequently, they may have a problematic impact on the
law reform organization's work if the member's activity is, in fact, party to a paid representation or
effort to curry favor with a client or prospective client.
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attorney efforts to attract particular clients is inconsistent with the professed
neutrality and perception of such organizations.2 6
In addition, a lawyer's efforts to influence law reform organizations
(either as a member or a non-member) can raise serious positional conflicts
of interest if the lawyer or law firm has clients with different preferences
regarding the product of law reform organizations. The mix of clients of a
national law firm, or even a sufficiently large single office firm, may have
diametrically opposed positions on an issue facing the law reform
organization.
For example, a law firm's Midwestern office may have a thriving
insurance recovery practice while its East Coast office may be doing
legislative work seeking to tamp down bad faith, unfair claims handling, and
punitive damages exposure for insurer clients or the insurance industry2 8
generally. As discussed below,2 9 this situation should probably be treated
as an impermissible positional conflict unless the respective clients give
informed consent even without any involvement of law reform activity.
Similarly, if lobbyist-lawyers turn their attention to obtaining pro-insurer
rules from a law reform organization (such as the ALI Restatement of the Law,
Liabi/ty Insurance (RLLI)), 1o this should also be treated as a positional
conflict, because success here can be more adverse to the client than
successful lobbying before a legislative or regulatory body or prosecuting
litigation adverse to a client.
II. POSITIONAL CONFLICTS, MATERIAL LIMITATION CONFLICTS, AND
IMPUTED CONFLICTS AFFECTING LAW REFORM ACTIVITY BY LAWYERS
Most lawyer conflicts are subject to what appears to be adequate policing.
First, there is the market for legal services. Clients, particularly sophisticated
26. SeeinfraPartII.
27. See infra Part I(A)(4).
28. Some may quibble or even quarrel with my reference to an insurance "industry," but I think
itisaccurate. Although the word industry tends to conjure images of smokestacks and assemblylines
rather than documents and computers, insurance is without a doubt a large enough commercial
enterprise to be termed an industry. See RICHARD V. ERICSON, ETAL., INSURANCEAS GOVERNANCE
3-6 (2003) (suggesting if insurance commerce was classed as a nation, it would be the third largest
economyin the world); ANDREWTOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS (1982) (notingthewide financial
influence of insurance commerce).
29. See infra Part II.
30. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 14A (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
Described in more detail infra notes 65-67.
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or experienced "repeat player"' clients, seek undivided, even enthusiastic
loyalty from their attorneys. These clients are likely to be vigilant in
detecting whether counsel is working for opposing interests in connection
with a commercial undertaking or litigation.
Also, if a conflict arises in the context of a particular business transaction
or lawsuit, other involved parties or counsel will often have an incentive to
detect and challenge arguable conflicts. In litigation, there is also the
presence of judicial officers (e.g., magistrate judges, clerks of court, judicial
staff) that may notice and probe arguable conflicts.
However, these structural factors mitigating against undetected conflicts
of interest may prove insufficient in the face of national law firms and
geographic separation of different cases or business deals. Nonetheless,
undetected or unpoliced direct conflicts of interest appear comparatively
rare. Even lackluster or ethically challenged counsel normally avoid these
types of conflicts. More troubling are the more subtle positional conflicts
that may seem less likely to injure a client, at least not directly. Detection
and appreciation may be even more difficult in the context of law reform
activity by counsel.
A. Positional Conf/cts and Their Imputation to Law Firms
1. The Positional Conflict Concept
One leading commentator has defined a positional conflict of interest as
existing when a lawyer or law firm: 32
adopts a legal position for one client seeking a particular legal result that is
directly contrary to the position taken on behalf of another present or former
client, seeking an opposite legal result, in a competey unrelated matter. The classic
positional conflict of interest arises in litigation when a lawyer or law firm
argues for one interpretation of the law on behalf of one client and for a
contrary interpretation on behalf of another client. Such conflicts may also
arise in the lobbying context when the lawyer or law firm is arguing for a
31. SeeMarc Galanter, Why the "Haves"Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the limits oflgal Change,
9 L. & SOC'YREV. 95,107 (1974) (distinguishing between litigants who are "one-shotters" and "repeat
player" who often are involved in litigation, positing that the latter group amasses expertise and
develops economies of scale and litigation systems providing substantial advantages); see also MARC
GALANTER, WHY THE HAVES COME OUT AHEAD: THE CLASSIC ESSAY AND NEW OBSERVATIONS
15-76 (2014) (updating the analysis given in his 1974 article).
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT r. 1.10(a)(1) (AM. BARASS'N 2020) (stating when
one lawyer is subject to a conflict, this conflict is imputed to his or her entire law firm).
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particular change in the law for one client and in another representation is
making a legal argument inconsistent with the position advanced for the first
client. These conflicts may further arise in the transaction context when the
lawyer or law firm drafts a particular arrangement for one client and for
another client attacks the propriety of a similar arrangement.3 3
More succinctly, such conflicts, sometimes referred to as "issue" conflicts,
have been defined as arising "when a lawyer's successful advocacy of a
client's legal position in one case could be detrimental to the interests of a
different client in another case."3 4
In addition to obvious conflicts, such as when a law firm is representing
a plaintiff and a defendant in the same case, there can be positional conflicts
where a lawyer or law firm advocates inconsistent positions for different
clients in different matters. There can also be positional conflicts where the
firm lobbies for a legal position on behalf of one client that works to the
detriment of another client. Historically, this type of lobbying positional
conflict has been addressed in the context of direct efforts to influence
legislative or regulatory bodies as part of a lawyer-as-lobbyist retention of
the law firm.
33. John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts ofInterest, 71 TEx. L. REV. 457, 460 (1993) (footnote
omitted). Arguing such inconsistent positions in the same matter on behalf of a single client involved
in that matter would presumably also fall below the standard of care expected of a reasonably
competent attorney unless part of an effort by the lawyer to argue "in the alternative." Id. But it would
not be a conflict per se, only bizarre lawyering absent unusual circumstances justifying such a tactic.
Hence Professor Dzienkowski's emphasis on an attorney takinginconsistentpositions in two separate
matters rather than in the same matter.
To be clear, I take a somewhat more "high church" view of positional conflicts than
Professor Dzienkowski. His position is that "[v]ery few positional conflicts will implicate the 'directly
adverse' language of Model Rule 1.7(a)," and that "[m]ost positional conflicts will involve an
examination of whether the conflict 'materially limits' the representation of one or both clients under
Model Rule 1.7(b)." Id. at 521.
By contrast, I place more emphasis on Model Rule 1.7(a) in positing that because almost any legal-
issue conflict can result in precedent adverse to a law firm client, there is very strong, albeit indirect,
adversity between the two law firm clients and this adversity is sufficiently real that it should generally
be treated as a direct conflict violating Rule 1.7(a). If the two (or more) cases in which counsel argues
opposite sides of a legal issue cannot be sufficiently factually distinguished to ensure the precedent of
Case A will not apply to Case B, client consent is required.
34. ELLEN J. BENNETT, ELIZABETH J. COHEN& HELEN W. GUNNARSSON, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 148 (8th ed. 2015) (citing Williams v. State,
805 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002)); see also Helen C. Anderson, gal Doubletalk and the Concern ith Positional
Conflicts: A 'Foolish Consistency"?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 22 (2006) (reviewing the Wilams v. State
decision); Douglas R. Richmond, ChoosingSides: Issue or Positional Conficts ofInterest, 51 FLA. L. REV. 383,
384-85 (1999) ("The clients' common lawyer is stranded between [law and public policy], facing a
representation at odds with another position or interest that he represents.").
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In this Article, I am focusing on the type of positional conflict created
when the lawyer, who is a member of a law reform organization, argues in
favor of Position A under circumstances where the organization's adoption
of Position A is likely to influence courts to the detriment of one or more
of the law firm's clients.
2. The Profession's Lax View of Positional Conflicts
Positional conflicts are not as stark as conflicts in which the lawyer is
helping to collect a debt for Client A in one case while attempting to thwart
its collection efforts in a parallel case. But positional conflicts are conflicts
nonetheless. As Professor Dzienkowski noted in his leading article on the
topic a quarter-century ago, the legal profession was slow to recognize the
problem and slower still to act, in both the academy3 5 and among bar
associations, regulators, and law reform groups.
For example, commentary to ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.7 at one time stated: "it is ordinarily not improper to assert
[opposing or antagonistic legal] positions in cases pending in different trial
courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time
in an appellate court." 6 The ABA has essentially continued to hold this
position but with more nuance and without the "same court" criterion for
finding conflict. Current Comment [24] to Rule 1.7 states:
Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals
at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating
a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the
interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not
35. Arguably, the matter of issue or positional conflicts was not noted in publications prior to
Professor Hazard's Ethics in the Practice ofLaw, which was, perhaps ironically, prompted by his concern
about lawyers working toward law reform that would adversely affect their firm's clients. GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 90-92 (1978) [Hereinafter HAZARD, ETHICS].
The Hazard & Hodes treatise on professional responsibility also noted the problem, but not at great
length. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING 1.07, at 1-26
(4th ed. Supp. 2019) ("In more recent times, intensifying since the last quarter of the twentieth century,
enforcement of the law of lawyeringby the courts has taken place principally in disciplinary proceedings
brought under increasingly detailed and legalistic codes of professional conduct."); see also RICHARD H.
UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS 3.4.3, at 84 (1st ed. 1988) ("When such a
conflict arises because two clients have antagonistic interests regarding a legal question in different
pending cases, it may be referred to as an issue confict."). It appears that the issue received no extensive
academic discussion until Professor Dzienkowski's 1993 article.
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BARASS'N 1983) (Conflicts in Litigation).
The comment was since removed as part of the Ethics 2000 revisions of the Model Rules.
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create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a
significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially
limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different
case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent
likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client.
Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the
risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or
procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of
the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and
the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is
significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the
affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw
from one or both matters.3 7
The AL's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers took a similar view. A
tentative draft of what is now Restatement § 209, cmt. f stated:
merely indirect precedential effect on another client's legal position does not
constitute a conflict. Lawyers do not personally vouch for the soundness of
their legal arguments. Thus, the lawyer's role in producing aprecedent should
play no proper part in the determination of whether one court should follow
the precedent of another.3 8
The final version of Comment f is similarly dismissive of positional
conflicts but stops short of immunizing positional conflicts in different
courts. Instead, like the ABA Model Rules, it opts for a multi-factor
balancing test to determine when counsel's opposing positions pose
sufficient risk of harm to a client.
f Concurrently taking adverse legal positions on behalf of different cents. A lawyer
ordinarily may take inconsistent legal positions in different courts at different
times. While each client is entitled to the lawyer's effective advocacy of that
client's position, if the rule were otherwise law firms would have to specialize
in a single side of legal issues.
However, a conflict is presented when there is a substantial risk that alawyer's
action in Case A will materially and adversely affect another of the lawyer's
clients in Case B. Factors relevant in determining the risk of such an effect
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cnt. 24 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 209 crnt. f (AM. LAW INST.
Tent. Draft No. 4,1991). The final Restatementwas published in 2000.
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include whether the issue is before a trial court or an appellate court; whether
the issue is substantive or procedural; the temporal relationship between the
matters; the practical significance of the issue to the immediate and long-run
interests of the clients involved; and the clients' reasonable xpectations in
retaining the lawyer. If a conflict of interest exists, absent informed consent
of the affected clients under § 122 [the client consent provisions of the
Restatement that essentially mirror the requirements of ABA Model R. Prof
Conduct 1.7(b)], the lawyer must withdraw from one or both of the matters.
Informed client consent is provided for in § 122.
Contemporaneous with the Dzienkowski article, a 1993 ABA ethics
opinion4 0 took an even more tolerant view of positional conflicts, reasoning
that positional conflicts were essentially no problem unless the lawyer or law
firm took different positions in front of the same tribunal.4 ' Although the
ABA Committee did "not believe that a distinction should be drawn
between appellate and trial courts," it was comfortable overlooking such
conflicts if the legal arguments were made in different jurisdictions.4 2
39. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 128 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
A revision was published in 2006 without substantial change to this section and commentary.
A moment's reflection is required regarding the 1991 ALI tentative position that a world of law
firms taking the "single side" of a legal issue would be untenable as suggested by Comment f. The
legal profession rightly celebrates an attorney's ability to see all sides of an issue or dispute, but this
does not necessarily mean it should celebrate lawyers talking out of both sides of their collective
mouths. Further, in practice the legal world largely does divide into plaintiff and defendant firms,
policyholder and insurance firms, union firms and management firms, anti-regulatory firms and
regulator counsel, prosecutors and criminal defense firms.
The division results in part from these firms, their clients, and courts taking positional conflicts
more seriously than did the ALI and the organized bar thirty years ago but also results from concrete
conflicts affecting clients with divergent interests. Even if ALI Comment f were persuasive at the time
initially drafted (which I doubt), intervening developments have suggested that celebration of the
attorney who can argue Position A on Wednesday and Position Non-A on Thursday is misplaced.
A lawyer who argues that the law imposes a duty of disclosure on an annuity salesman in Case A
but simultaneously contends in Case Ba similarly situated annuity salesman has no such duty will strike
most observers,lay and professional, as duplicitous rather than flexible, clever, or creative.
40. See ABA Comm. On Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993)
[hereinafter ABA 377] (claiming positional conflicts were not an issue unless attorneys took contrasting
positions when in the presence of the same tribunal).
41. See id. ("And if both cases should happen to end up before the same judge, the situation
would be even worse . .. the persuasiveness and credibility of the lawyer's arguments in at least one of
the two pending matters would quite possibly be lessened, consciously or subconsciously, in the mind
of the judge.").
42. Id.
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However,
if the two matters are being litigated in the same jurisdiction, and there is a
substantial risk that the law firm's representation of one client will create a
legal precedent, even if not binding, which is likely materially to undercut the
legal position being urged on behalf of the other client, the lawyer should
either refuse to accept the second representation or (if otherwise permissible)
withdraw from the first, unless both clients consent after full disclosure of the
potential ramifications of the lawyer continuing to handle both matters.
If, on the other hand, the two matters will not be litigated in the same
jurisdiction, the lawyer should nevertheless attempt to determine fairly and
objectively whether the effectiveness of her representation of either client will
be materially limited by the lawyer's (or her firm's) representation of the
other.4 3
The ABA opinion then listed a number of factors for the attorney to
consider in determining whether juggling the inconsistent legal arguments
posed sufficient danger to the clients to require counsel to withdraw,
including the importance of the legal issue, the likelihood that a decision on
the issue in one court would impact a second court's decision, whether the
attorney might "soft-pedal" one version of the argument if the other version
was being maintained on behalf of a more valued client, and whether the
firm might try to respond to any allegations of inconsistency by blurring the
respective legal arguments and positions.4 4 Even if these factors suggested
a substantial conflict and significant danger to either client, the ABA opinion
found the conflict waivable with informed client consent.4 5
The ABA Opinion was consistent with most of the state bar opinions of
that period that had, like the ABA, viewed positional conflicts as less
concerning than conflicts surrounding the more concrete adversity of lawyer
representation in related cases or transactions.4 ' The opinions either saw
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. ("[1]n the absence of consent by both clients after full disclosure, [the attorney] should
refuse to accept the second representation . . . .").
46. See Phila. Bar. Assn. Prof. Guid. Comm., Op. 89-27 (1990) [hereinafter Phila. 27] ("[I]t is
ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be
improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court."); see Cal. St. Bar. Comm.
Profl Resp., Op. 108 (1989) [hereinafter Cal. 108] (discussing the issues of representing multiple
clients in the same tribunal); see St. Bar of Ariz. Ethics Opinions, Op. 15 (1987) [hereinafter Ariz. 15]
("Appellate judges are presumably trained to recognize that advocates are often required to take
positions contrary to those previously taken by their partners, when the interests of a client so
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little danger to clients at all" or danger only if the law firm was maintaining
opposing legal positions before the same tribunal," sometimes only if
before an appellate court. 9  The opinions were also concerned that
positional conflicts are hard to detect at the outset of a matter, which raised
concern that disqualification or bar discipline would be too harsh a penalty
for a positional conflict that was not apparent when the law firm agreed to
the representation.5 0
Prior to Professor Dzienkowski's extensive analysis, only the Michigan
Bar took anything resembling a stand against positional conflicts, but this
was in a matter that involved asserting contrary legal positions before the
same court.5 '   Thereafter, more jurisdictions displayed somewhat more
require."). This trend continued even after the Dzienkowski article brought positional conflicts into
the forefront. See Dzienkowski, sura note 33, at 474 (describing the different types of positional
conflicts).
47. See Cal. 108, suira note 46 (suggesting positional conflicts pose less danger to clients than
other conflicts); see also Ariz. 15, sra note 46 (same); Me. Bd. Of Overseers of the Bar, Profl Ethics
Comm'n, Op. 155 (1997) [hereinafter Me. 155] (concluding a legal issue conflict alone is not an
actionable conflict).
48. See Me. 155, sziranote 47 (stating positional conflicts are impermissible only ifinconsistent
legalpositions are asserted before the same tribunal); accordD.C. Ethics Op. No. 265 (1996).
49. See ABA 377, suira note 40 (explaining positional conflicts are only impermissible if
inconsistent legal positions asserted before the same appellate court); see also Ariz. 15, spra note 46
(same); Phila. 27, supra note 46 (same).
50. See Me. 155, supra note 47 (discussing the difficulties of detecting positional conflicts on
intake; disqualification after conflict became apparent could produce unfair results for counsel and
clients seeking to retain preferred counsel).
51. See St. Bar of Mich. Ethics Opinions, Op. RI-108 (1991) (opposing attorneys presenting
opposing legal positions before the same court). The case involved counsel (apparently not only the
same law firm but also the same individual lawyer) arguing contrary legal positions on a point of
domestic relations law in two separate divorce proceedings that had both been appealed to the state
supreme court. The Bar found it was:
Not necessary to determine the exact point in time at which the representation of the client
became "directly adverse" triggering MRPC 1.7(a), or "materially adverse" triggering MRPC
1.7(b), or when that adversity should have been apparent to the lawyer. We need only note on
the facts provided, i.e., that the cases are both before the Supreme Court, and that effective
advocacy on behalf of one client would contravene the position of the other. Under those
circumstances a disinterested lawyer could not reasonably conclude that the representation of the
client would not be adversely affected. Client consent, therefore, would not vitiate the conflict.
Nor may the lawyer withdraw from one case without withdrawing from the other.
Continued representation [of either client] in the event of consolidation under the facts presented
is not ethically permissible, and the lawyer must withdraw from both representations. In so
holding we are aware that the clients suffer greatly by having their successful and apparently
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concern, at least rhetorically, but the overall stance of the organized bar
remained tolerant of such conflicts.5 2  Treatises,53 casebooks, 5 4 and
commentators expressed a larger concern, but only a fewjoined Professor
Dzienkowski's relatively strong stance against positional conflicts.5 5
sufficiently competent legal representation removed at the Supreme Court level. We see no way
that result can be ethically avoided.
Id.
52. See Or. St. Bar, Formal Op. 2007-177 (rev. 2016) (describing how issue conflicts are not a
separate category of conflict in the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct); see also N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 826 (2008) ("[The burden of satisfying the 'disinterested lawyer' test in
these cases will often be a high one.").
53. See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS 387-89 (5th ed. 2016) (detailing the issues with an attorney's simultaneous
representation of clients with adverse interests); supra notes 34-35; see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE 1.7-6(o) (2012-
2013) (addressing positional conflicts but dedicating only five pages of 1324-page treatise to the issue).
54. For example, the authors of The Lax and Ethics ofLaering, in its index, identifies only two
pages (in a 1,262-page book) as dealing with positional conflicts, but this is unduly modest in that the
casebook also reprints an edited version of W estinghouse Elec. Cop. v. Kerr-McGee Cor., (discussed infra
note 59), which maybe the leading positional conflict case. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,JR. ET AL., THE
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 477-78, 468-76 (6th ed. 2017); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 580F.2d 1311 (7thCir.1978). The authors correctly note there is a "generally
permissive attitude of the ethics rules toward positional conflicts of interest" and that "[u]nlike other
conflicts of interest, positional conflicts are rarely the subject of disqualification motions." Id. at 477.
They appear to find this situation acceptable because "many lawyers and law firms worry about taking
inconsistent positions simply as a matter of good client relations" and that market forces sufficiently
curb abuses. Id.; Anderson, supra note 34, at 3.
Stephen Gillers's RegulationofLaners:Problems ofLay andEthicscontains no significant discussion
of positional conflicts per se, at least regarding legal issues, as opposed to contrasting legal positions
affecting specific property or remedies as the authors of The La and Ethics ofLanyeringillustrate through
their excerpt of Fiandaca v. Cunningham, in which legal aid lawyers sought to improve conditions at a
state hospital in one case, while exploring a settlement to utilize a school for a women's prison in
another case. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS
(10th ed. 2015); Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987). Gillers's book contains a
positional conflict hypothetical problem ("Restraint of Trade") in which a law firm is arguing for
different legal positions in different cases and the court's decision on the issue in one case will likely
hurt another firm client in the other case. GILLERS, sura at 192-201.
55. To the contrary, commentators generally appear more concerned that a strong stance
against positional conflicts will inflict a greater injury upon client access to lawyers of their choice or
upon public interest lawyering than the existing risk of adverse precedent manufactured by a client's
own law firm. See Anderson, sura note 34, at 3-4 (arguing that positional conflicts should not be
treated as sufficiently serious to support disqualification of counsel); see also Peter Margulies, Multple
Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of Interest and the Mission of the Legal Serices Layer,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2340 (1999) (using the term "doctrinal conflicts" to describe positional
conflicts as the term is used in this Article); Richmond, supra note 34, at 386 (expressing concern that
aggressive policing of positional conflicts unduly impinges on attorney prerogatives and can foster
opportunistic behavior by clients and opposing parties and counsel). Butsee Esther F. Lardent, Positional
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Moreover, bar associations appear to have rarely imposed professional
discipline due to an attorney's positional conflict.5 6
Courts historically exhibited a similar pattern.57  More recently, courts
have begun to acknowledge the issue and have expressed concern previously
lacking, 5 but have seldom found positional conflicts sufficient to require
disqualification or sanction.5  Thus, as of2020, the legal landscape forbids
Conflicts in the Pro Bono Context: Ethical Considerations andMarket Forces, 67 FORDHAML. REv. 2279,2286-
87 (1999) (following the work of Dzienkowski in positional conflicts); Norman W. Spaulding, Note,
The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Confcts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1408-
09 (1998) (favoring a relaxed approach to positional conflict where attorney pro bono activity allegedly
creates conflict and risk to client of pro bono attorney's law firm).
56. Because one should (according to the clich) "never say never," I use the word "rarely"
because a thorough canvassing of the professional discipline of all U.S. bar associations is beyond the
scope of this Article. Further, even a diligent state-by-state search would not capture private
reprimands, making it impossible to declare that positional conflicts never leads to professional
discipline. However, I have yet to find a state bar disciplinary sanction based solely on an attorney's
positional conflicts.
57. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 2 (noting prominent attorney and former U.S. Senator
Matthew Hale Carpenter argued "contradictory interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
privileges and immunities clause to the [U.S.] Supreme Court in two famous cases" without notice or
criticism by the Court). Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138 (1873) (arguing the Clause
prohibited exclusionary policies precluding a woman's bar admission), with Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36, 58-61 (1873) (arguing Louisiana could establish a butchering monopoly and forbid others
from practicing the trade). The cases were argued two weeks apart and the rulingin the Slaughter-House
Cases favoring state authority in the face of constitutional challenge was adverse precedent leading to a
loss for Bradwell when that opinion was issued a day later. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 3 ("The
Bradell decision relied almost exclusively on the precedent set in the Slaughter-House Cases one day
earlier.").
58. See Williams v. State, 805 A.2d 880, 882 (Del. 2002) (disqualifying attorney for positional
conflict when attorney argued two contrary legal positions before the state supreme court, first
asserting "great weight" should be given to jury's non-unanimous recommendation against death
penalty but then arguingit was error to give such weight to jury recommendation in the second); Estates
Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (disqualifying
counsel making inconsistent legal arguments in different antitrust cases in same jurisdiction but case
arguably factually related due to client fear that one case would develop not just precedent but adverse
evidence that could be used in other cases); see also Richmond, supra note 34, at 398-99 (noting
Estates Theatres may better be classed as a fact conflict case rather than a legal issue conflict case as the
ruling was decided pursuant to the ABA's MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(B)
rather than the modem Model Rules of Professional Conduct, suggesting the opinion is not well
regarded). Richmond also notes that Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277
(Pa. 1992) is often regarded as a positional conflict case. Richmond, supra note 34, at 398. I regard
Maritrans as better classified as a "playbook" disqualification case. See GILLERS, sura note 54, at 225-
28.
59. See In re Rail Freight Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d 104, 118 (D.D.C. 2013)
(rejecting disqualification motion attacking Latham & Watkins for defending Union Pacific Railroad in
an antitrust case at the same time it was also representing, in unrelated matters, a shipper making an
antitrust claim against the Railroad using different counsel than Latham but arguing that Latham's
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extreme positional conflicts but grants lawyers a good deal of slack regarding
moderate positional conflicts. In retrospect, the legal profession's tolerance
of positional conflicts prior to the 1990s was ill-founded and has become
less defensible over time. Even today, positional conflicts are often
overlooked and unduly tolerated.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 93-377 acknowledged the force of the
argument that advancing inconsistent legal positions could be as detrimental
to clients as advancing contrary factual positions (e.g., that in Case A the
person was not an employee and thus not entitled to overtime pay, and then
arguing in Case B that a similarly situated person was an employee and could
not sue in tort because of the worker's compensation bar to suits by
employees).6 0  But the Opinion disapproved of lawyers advancing
conflicting legal positions only if this took place "in the same jurisdiction."61
success in obtaining favorable law for the Railroad would redound to the detriment of the shipper);
Fed. Defs. of San Diego, Inc. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 680 F. Supp. 26, 33 (D.D.C. 1988)
(concludingno impermissible positional conflictwhere Defenders challenging sentencing guidelines in
one case while a substantial number of its clients stood to benefit from continued use of guidelines
under challenge). Mandatory application of the guidelines was eventually ruled unconstitutional in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). But see Westinghouse Elec. Co., 580 F.2d at 1322 (finding
impermissible conflict where the Chicago office of Kirkland and Ellis represented plaintiff
Westinghouse in antitrust action against Kerr-McGee and a dozen other energy companies at the same
time its Washington, D.C. office was representing the American Petroleum Institute of which some
defendant oil companies were members). Signaling its disapproval of the arrangement at the outset of
the opinion, the court wrote that the case presented the issue of "whether the size and geographical
scope of a law firm exempt it from the ordinary ethical considerations applicable to lawyers generally."
Id. at 1312; accordRichmond, supra note 34, at 401 ("Kirkland's conflict of interest was, or should have
been, obvious."). Like Fiandaca and Martrans, Westinghouse is perhaps better characterized as an actual
conflict of direct factual adversity rather than a legal issue positional conflict case. See Richmond, supra
note 34, at 402-03 ("Westinghouse vidences the practical problems that issue or positional conflicts
pose for lawyers."); see also Anderson, sura note 34, at 19 ("The cases usually cited by commentators
on positional conflicts actually present factual positional conflicts.").
Fiandacais widely regarded as a positional conflicts case, which explains its presence in casebooks,
but this strikes me as a mischaracterization. See, e.g., GILLERS, sura note 54, at 192-96. In Fiandaca,
the New Hampshire Legal Assistance (NHLA) represented two classes of clients, female inmates and
persons with mental disabilities. Fiandaca, 827 F.3d at 826. The defendant State offered to settle the
prisoner litigation by offering use of a school already being used for the disabled, which prevented
NHLA from arguing use of the facility that would imperil the settlement. Id. at 827. This is more
accurately described as a concrete factual or remedial conflict involving use of tangible property and
case resolution, rather than a clash of different legal arguments. Consequently, I do not regard Fiandaca
as presenting a true "issue" conflict or positional conflict, at least as I am using the term in this Article.
See Richmond, sura note 34, at 388 n.31 (appearing to classify Fiandaca as a fact-based conflict case
rather than a legal issues conflict case).
60. ABA Comm. on Ethics& Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993).
6 1. Id.
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The same jurisdiction rationale for limiting the scope of positional
conflict analysis made little sense in 1993 and makes no sense today. In a
world where all precedent is widely available online, even if not "officially
published" or controlling, a court's decision regarding a legal issue remains
de facto legal precedent, even if not controlling beyond its jurisdictional
reach. The typical judge cares a great deal more about how other courts
have ruled on a question than about academic commentary or public policy
arguments made by counsel. In most cases, only clear statutory language or
a clearly distinct fact pattern is likely to sufficiently reduce the risk that a law
firm's victory on a legal issue in Case A will likely impact Case B, a matter
in which the law firm is making a diametrically opposite argument.
Where a lawyer plays a role in obtaining legal precedent in Court X that
is favorable to Client A but that is adverse to Client B in Court Y, the lawyer
has disserved Client B due to its work for Client A. This is a conflict-
helping one client at the expense of another-regardless of whether the
adverse precedent favoring Client A is controlling or merely available for
use against Client B. Regardless of the jurisdiction involved, law firms
should avoid positional conflicts and take them much more seriously than
appears to be the case in practice today.6 2
3. Modern Law Practice and the Increasing Danger of Positional
Conflicts
Ironically, the very thing that makes the problem worse-more far-flung
branch offices of law firms-also tends to obscure the problem. If the same
individual lawyer argued for RuleX in CaseA for ClientA and
simultaneously argued for inconsistent Rule Y on behalf of Client B in
Case B, observers would likely notice and appreciate the conflict. But
because the inconsistency is produced by attorneys practicing in different
offices of a law firm, the conflict can escape notice notwithstanding the
national firm's electronic interconnectedness and conflicts software (which
will tend to miss positional conflicts more than it misses client identity
conflicts).
Even a narrow reading of ABA Model Rule 1.10 makes the existence of
the positional conflict clear. Rule 1.10 provides that:
62. This type of conflict is in many cases waivable pursuant to ABA Model Rule 1.7(b), but
both clients must be apprised of the situation and give informed consent confirmed in writing. And
in some cases, such as when Case A is before the state supreme court which will decide the matter
prior to a ruling in Case B, which is before a trial court in the same state, the conflict is much more
acute. In my view, that sort of conflict is so concrete that it cannot be waived.
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[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by [Conflict of Interest] Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless (1) the
prohibition is based on a personal interest of the disqualified lawyer and does
not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the
client by the remaining lawyers in the firm[.] 6 3
This is the rule that imputes individual attorney conflicts throughout the
attorney's law firm, a rule designed to prevent lawyers from evading
conflicts rules and disserving clients by merely having the disloyal activity
performed by two different workers at the same entity. Because
participation in law reform activities is part of the "personal interest" of an
attorney, there is debate about the degree to which Rule 1.10 applies to
episodes such as an attorney advocating for aparticular restatement rule that
is likely to affect a law firm client adversely. The personal interest exception
to Rule 1.10 should apply only when a lawyer's participation in law reform
activity is truly individual, personal, and genuine, rather than the result of
specific retention or client development marketing efforts.
Perhaps even more troubling than inconsistent legal arguments from
different law firm counsel in different cases may be a lawyer's advocacy
before a law reform organization such as the ALI, the ABA, or a committee
or task force. Such advocacy may result in a black letter restatement
provision (or a rule, statute, or its equivalent), which will almost certainly be
used against clients of the law firm.
4. Potential Positional Conflicts in Law Reform Activity
Although perhaps not as obvious as the conflicts involving law firm
representation of clients advancing conflicting positions in different cases,
genuine positional conflicts may arise when lawyers in the firm engage in
law reform activity. For example, Lawyer A from Big Firm may be active
in seeking pro-insurer content of the RLLI while Lawyer B from the same
Big Firm may be representing policyholders who will be adversely affected
by Lawyer A's success in making the RLLI more pro-insurer. As discussed
below,6 many of the attorneys who have advocated for pro-insurer content
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.10(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
64. See infra Part III.
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in the RLLI are members of large law firms that represent policyholders.65
Surprisingly, this has not been identified (by the commentators themselves,
their opponents, the Institute, or the media) as a conflict of interest.6 6
But this type of situation nonetheless poses a positional conflict of
interest, at least in circumstances where the lawyer-member of a law reform
organization is not speaking solely out of personal opinion but is being
compensated for the lawyer's efforts to aid a party or industry in attempting
to influence the work product of the law reform organization. This type of
partisanship is impossible tojustify if the lawyer's advocacy for a pro-insurer
RLLI position does not stem from the attorney's personal beliefs but instead
results from retention of the lawyer or firm by an insurer (or fellow traveler
such as a corporation that may have an interest in the contract construction
65. I know this because I have seen case reports in which partners of a lawyer attacking the
RLLI were counsel of record forpolicyholders who presumablywould prefer that the RLLInot contain
the pro-insurer position sought by the partner participating in law reform.
During the RLLI process, I observed one partner in a large firm arguing vigorously and frequently
for positions favorable to insurers. If adopted, these positions would have-in a case in which I was
involved as an expert witness-hurt another client of the firm's efforts to obtain insurance coverage.
The pro-insurer law firm partners may be doing this solely out of personal interest and a sincere
and heartfelt intellectual view that the pro-insurer position is better law. But, where members of a law
reform organization devote scores of pages to commentary, I am skeptical this is done without official
support from the firm either at the urging of insurer clients or a desire to develop greater business with
insurer clients. Notwithstanding the legendary work ethic of many attorneys, it seems to me unlikely
that active private practitioners will find the time to write lengthy commentary without some form of
compensation other than internal satisfaction.
The same is true if a policyholder attorney or firm submits long white papers or similarly
time-intensive efforts to impact the content of the RLLI. If this occurs, the same criticisms apply. In
my experience, however, insurers are more likely to be "institutional" clients of particular law firms,
while policyholder clients are more episodic in their use of a specific law firm for insurance recovery
matters. In contrast, even a small insurer is more likely to regularly send business to a particular firm
and thus, is in a position to assert more leverage on the firm for the cause of insurers regarding
controversial portions of the RLLI.
Because of the volume of legal work an insurer can send to a favored firm, firms also have an
incentive to take pro-insurer action as a means of gaining favor from insurers generally and
demonstrating the law firm's support of the industry as a means of business development.
66. What might be termed as "the RLLI content battles," have received significant media
attention. There has also been some commentary criticizing anti-RLLI lobbying-correctly in my
view-as baseless, shrill, and unnecessarily invoking crisis rhetoric. See, e.g., Richard G. Johnson, The
ALIHasn'tBeen 'Captured', WALL ST.J.,July 7,2017, at A.14 (responding to Journaleditorial contending
that "tort lawyers" had taken over the ALI concerning the RLLI). See Tiger Joyce, Tort Layers Take
Over the American La Institute, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2017, at A.15 ("Aspirations for American business
leaders must include stopping the ALI's liability-expanding agenda and returning the organization to
the laudable scholarship and evenhandedness of its past."). But it appears I am alone in suggesting
that the lobbying surrounding the RLLI or law reform participation generally raises serious professional
responsibility concerns.
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or punitive damages portion of a Restatement on insurance). Even if the
lawyer or firm is not formally retained nor paid for its particular advocacy
regarding the RLLI (or similar law reform projects by other organizations),
if the lawyer or law firm activities are part of marketing efforts hoping to
draw business from insurers, the lawyer and law firm are conflicted.
Consider the example of RLLI Section 21, which provides that where an
insurer is properly required to defend a single potentially covered claim in a
multi-count complaint, the insurer must defend the entire lawsuit and
cannot later seek reimbursement of the defense expenditures made on
behalf of claims in the lawsuit that were not potentially covered under the
policy.67 If LawyerA, either as part of planned marketing and business
development or on behalf of a paying insurer client, lobbies against the
provision and in favor of adoption of the position that the insurer should
be able to recoup defense expenditures made in connection with uncovered
claims, LawyerA is working against the interests of the law firm's
policyholder clients, who may frequently find themselves in lawsuits where
at least one but not all of the claims in the complaint are potentially covered.
Obviously, a policyholder facing such an action would prefer to tender
defense of the matter to its insurer and receive a complete defense of the
lawsuit without rebating to the insurer some portion of the defense costs
associated with non-covered claims. Because the typical liability policy
states that it defends "suits" against the policyholder (and notjust individual
"claims" against the policyholder), 6 the policyholder has a pretty good
argument that it should not have to pay the insurer for any portion of the
defense, which is considered indivisible by most courts ruling on insurance
coverage matters.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the strength of this argument persuaded the
RLLI Reporters, ALI Council, and ALI Membership to support a
Restatement provision providing for no recoupment of defense costs by
insurers absent a clear agreement to this effect or in exceptional
circumstances. RLLI Section 21 is a provision favoring policyholders-but
does so based on policy language and the background, purpose, and
function of liability insurance rather than any unwarranted favoritism of
67. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. 21 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) ("Unless
otherwise stated in the insurance policy or otherwise agreed to by the insured, an insurer may not
obtain recoupment of defense costs from the insured . . . .").
68. See Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Policy No. CG 00 01 12 07
(2006), reprinted in JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PETER N. SWISHER & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INSURANCE LAW App. D (4th ed. 2011).
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policyholders over insurers. Nevertheless, the ability of a law firm's
policyholder clients to enjoy the benefit of this provision would be negated
if another lawyer in the firm had successfully convinced ALI to reverse or
delete RLLI Section 21. The policyholder clients of the law firm would
presumably object to this advocacy if they were aware of it. More than that,
they would prefer that the law firm they pay to prosecute insurance recovery
matters advocate for the provision-and not advocate against the provision
due to an effort to please the law firm's insurance clients (or prospective
clients)-and prefer that the law firm not accept a retention from insurers
that is adverse to the policyholders.
Policyholder and insurer clients of the law firm may be willing to consent
to such positional conflicts. In the absence of consent, it seems clear that a
lawyer's law reform advocacy done to aid one type of law firm client
(insurers) that is detrimental to another law firm client (policyholders)
violates Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.7. This should be acceptable
to the law reform organization, if at all, only if the advocating lawyer is
genuinely expressing her analysis of a legal issue with no marketing or
compensatory motives. Even where her advocacy for insurers is
unsuccessful, her commentary against the resulting provision and fomenting
of additional criticisms may provide considerable aid to the law firm's
insurer clients at the expense of the law firm's policyholder clients.
For the most part, the ALI and other law reform organizations generate
"soft" law. Their work product does not itself create positive law but
produces a body of rules and norms courts are free to accept or reject.
However, even an unsuccessful lobbying effort based on positional conflict
may create a record that persuades courts not to follow the Restatement
provision or other soft law. This, in turn, may produce precedent harmful
to other clients of the law firm, which should be recognized as a violation
of Rule 1.7. Although it would raise howls in the halls of Big Firm Land, a
situation like this supports an argument that the Client of Lawyer B has
grounds for a malpractice suit against Big Firm because of Big Firm's
disloyalty in working to further the cause of a different client of Big Firm.
That the cases are separated in time and space does not change the fact
that Big Firm put itself in a position where it was certain to hurt one of the
two clients. Lawyer A's victory for the insurer Client did not create binding
precedent against Big Firm Client B. However, Lawyer A's work did, in
fact, hurt Client B-and this injury was completely foreseeable. A
competent law firm assumes that opponents of its clients will locate
precedent adverse to the clients no matter where the precedent is generated.
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Ethical law firms should take no part in creating that precedent or the soft
law that may produce such precedent unless this results solely from the
personal analysis of the individual attorney participating in law reform
activity.
B. Material Limitation Conficts and Law Reform Actiity
ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.7, which is substantially
the same form in all states, provides that an attorney should not represent a
client when the representation is "materially limited" by duties to another
client or the attorney's own interests.6  As noted above, Rule 1.10 provides
that when one lawyer is subject to a conflict, this conflict imputes to his or
her entire law firm.7 0
The ABA Model Rules do not specifically define the term "material," but
commentary to Rule 1.7 provides a rough working notion of what is meant
by the term:
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there
is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out
an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a
result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer
asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely
to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all
possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty
to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would
otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm
does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the
likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether
it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment
in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably
should be pursued on behalf of the client.7 1
The interests-of-Client A versus interests-of-Client B scenario previously
described could be described as a species of material limitation conflict
rather than a direct conflict of goals across two ostensibly unrelated matters.
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) ("A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if:. . . (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a
third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.").
70. See supra text accompanying note 62.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
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In addition, a material limitation exists if an attorney is forced to refrain
from representing a client as zealously as would ordinarily be the case
because of the attorney or law firm's duties to another client, even if the
clash is indirect. For example, in the positional conflict hypothetical
discussed above, an attorney in a firm regularly representing insurer clients
should not be arguing against recoupment of such costs by insurers as part
of counsel's strategy for drawing favorable attention from policyholder
counsel clients. Worse yet is a situation where the attorney has been retained
by policyholders to seek favorable law reform outcomes on their behalf
despite the law firm's concurrent representation of insurer clients.
In the metaphorical crevice between a rock and a hard place, the law firm
is materially limited from fully serving one class of clients, which violates
Rule 1.7 (although the conflict is probably waivable).7  Conversely, if other
lawyers in the law firm make a full-throated argument in favor of their
insurer clients seeking an RLLI provision favoring recoupment of counsel
fees for insurers, this is an activity adverse to the firm's policyholder clients.
The firm has engaged in an impermissible positional conflict if these
activities result from business activity (i.e., client retentions or marketing
efforts) rather than the personal interests of the attorneys involved.
Attorney or law firm interest in having aprofitable practice can also create
an arguable material limitation (or at least its close analog). For example, a
lawyer or law firm may be very interested in cultivating a potential
policyholder or insurer client. As part of its marketing strategy, it may
deliberately engage in legal scholarship and law reform activism designed to
catch the eye and win the confidence of such clients. Big Firm Lawyer A, a
partner, may enlist several associates to facilitate commentary in the law
reform area as well as participating in organizations like the ALI, the AAJ,
the DRI, or the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Although
Big Firm is not expected to bill anyone for this time, lead partner Lawyer A
and others involved in the project record their time on the matter, and it is
part of their annual assessments.
72. Rule 1.7(b) provides that if the lawyer reasonably believes the conflict will not affect the
quality of counsel's advocacy and the client gives informed consent confirmed in writing, the conflict
can be waived. Id. r. 1.7(b). To be waivable, the conflict must not be direct. Id. r. 1.7(b)(3). Because
a positional conflict of the type discussed in the hypothetical in Part IILA, like most positional
conflicts, is indirect and involves factually distinct matters, it would appear to be waivable pursuant to
Rule 1.7(b). Id. r. 1.7(b).
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Operatingin this manner (which hardly appears like a far-fetched scenario
in light of the business pressures on modern firms), 7 there is now a
situation in which the law firm has arguably created its own material
limitation (or the substantial equivalent)7  on its ability to zealously
represent any clients of the firm with interests adverse to the prospective
clients the firm is trying to attract through its law reform activity. For
example, while Lawyer A and his team are-with the express blessing of the
firm's business plan-seeking to establish themselves as the champion of
insurers in coverage matters, how likely is it that other lawyers in the firm
will be going all out for policyholder clients to establish favorable precedent
to use against the insurer clients the firm is trying to attract?
I do not mean to make too much of this sort of danger, which can, of
course, also involve law firms fishing for large commercial policyholder
clients at the expense of full-bore representation of insurer clients who may
have annoyed the firm for years with their penchant for negotiating low
hourly rates and close, even knit-picking scrutiny of billings. But it is a
danger, nonetheless. As further discussed below, law firm business or client
development is probably more problematic in that it effectively puts lawyers
partially "on the clock" for a particular client or industry that the firm
intends to please and from which the firm hopes to obtain future business.
This removes the attorney's participation in law reform from the purely
73. The once quaint idea that law was merely a learned profession and not a business has fallen
by the wayside. Modern law practice involves marketing, attempts at efficient management, and
attention to cash flow and profitability. As part of this modern practice,law firms seek to attract paying
clients, a marketing strategy that ranges from outright advertising to simply doing excellent work that
it hopes will be noticed (by opponents as well as current clients and observers) in order to generate
future business. Along this spectrum falls attorney participation in organized bar and law reform
activity as well as contribution to legal periodicals and legal debate as a means of standing out as an
expert in a field. Law firms may also participate in "beauty contests" or "bake offs," in which they
compete with other firms for business by touting their expertise, which can include promoting the
degree to which the law firm champions the legal positions of a prospective client such as an insurer,
stock broker, bank, manufacturer, drug company or the like.
74. Where the law firm is attempting to attract potential clients rather than seeking to develop
closer relations or more business with existing client, Rule 1.7 does not technically apply because the
prospective client is just that-solely a potential client rather than an actual client. But the situation
creates similar problems of disserving one client or set of clients in order to curry favor with others or
because of responsibilities to others. In the latter situation of existing client development that includes
law reform activity, this would appear to fit fully within Rule 1.7's prohibition on material limitation
conflicts. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) (identifying
Rule 1.7 applies to current clients and referring to separate provisions for former and prospective
clients).
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"personal" model that could arguably avoid a positional conflict or violation
of the rules and norms of a law reform organization.
III. CLIENT-SUPPORTING PARTISANSHIP AND CLIENT-SEEKING
BEHAVIOR AS BREACHES OF THE ATTORNEY'S DUTY
TO A LAW REFORM ORGANIZATION
Even less appreciated than positional and material imitation conflicts are
the legal ethics implications of participation in a law reform organization.
Surprisingly undiscussed to date is the issue of the professional
responsibility obligations of ALI members and non-member commentators
in debating the RLLI. A similar silence attends the law reform efforts of bar
organizations and other law and policy groups.
Conflict of interest Rules 1.7 and 1.10, of course, apply to legislative and
law reform advocacy as well. However, they are complicated by the practical
reality that society should generally want the legal expertise of the Bar
weighing in on important legal issues, and by the well-established ALI norm
(shared by the ABA and other bar associations) that members should "check
their clients at the door" and say what they individually think rather than
advocating positions to curry favor with clients. There is also the reality that
after years or representing insurers or policyholders, attorneys tend to
embrace client views and often honestly "believe" them.
Despite the need for law reform organizations to function with a wide
range of input from various members, conflicts of interest need to be taken
more seriously in law reform group advocacy. Where a member who has
long identified with a particular client constituency (e.g., a career insurer-
side coverage lawyer), it is perfectly fine for that lawyer to both comment
on and attempt to change the RLLI to fit what she regards as the better
rule-so long as this is her actual opinion and is not done as part of a
retention to further client interests or as client development and marketing
by the attorney. If the latter, the material limitation and positional conflict
problems discussed above would appear to apply.
In addition, such caseswould appearto fall squarely within Rule 1.10 and
impute to an entire law firm because a lawyer's paid service or marketing
activity makes the lawyer's law reform activity something other than merely
a "personal interest" of the lawyer. This applies even if the lawyer so
engaged in paid lobbying or unpaid but business-directed client
development ruly believes what he or she is saying about a law reform issue.
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A. Distinguishing LawReorm bbying From Layer Pubc Service
Model Rule 6.3 permits attorneys to serve as an officer, director, or
member of a legal services organization, even if that organization "serves
persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer." 5 However, the
lawyer "shall not knowingly participate" in organization decisions that
"would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under
[conflict of interest] Rule 1.7" or in cases where the lawyer's "decision or
action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client
of the [legal services] organization whose interests are adverse to a client of
the lawyer."7 6
Model Rule 6.4 specifically, if only sketchily, addresses the issue of "Law
Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests" and provides that:
A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization
involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the
reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer
knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision
in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need
not identify the client.7 7
The disclosure requirement is one protecting against "the possibility that law
reform organizations may be used as 'fronts' for private interests."7 8  But
this seems an overly sanguine view of the Rule, which depends on self-
policing and requires little specificity concerning the disclosure. Not only is
client identification not required, but neither is there any requirement to
provide any information regarding the magnitude of the client's importance,
whether the client is providing compensation, or whether the client has
lobbied the lawyer to lobby the law reform organization.
This last item may seem pedestrian or too invasive of attorney-client
privilege, but it is perhaps the fact one would most like to know in order to
assess the genuineness of a lawyer's law reform activity-maybe even more
than law firm billings of clients. Clients can vary dramatically to the extent
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
76. Id.
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020). The lone Comment to
the Rule further provides that "[i]n determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities,
a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7." See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.4 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) (stating the disclosure
provided should also be "appropriate").
78. HAZARD ETAL., supra note 54, at 53.3.
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they appreciate and tolerate the law reform or other outside activities of their
lawyers. Some clients are relatively lax or even enlightened in that they
respect counsel's right to express views that are at odds with the prevailing
views of the client. Other clients demand conformity, or at least will not
permit outward nonconformity, and are likely to pull business from a law
firm that appears insufficiently loyal and in sync with its world view. Some
of these clients not only set a tone but also demand action on behalf of the
client's interests.
There are few, if any, reported cases applying Model Rule 6.4, and only
two state bar opinions address the scope of the Rule.7  Both opinions
involved quite benign situationsso that did not present the type of studied
industry attempts to influence ALI work experienced during the Corporate
Governance project,81 the Restatement of Torts regarding tobacco,82 and the
RLLI. But in addition to whatever strictures are established by the Rules of
Professional Responsibility, are the rules of law reform organizations
themselves.
The tension between attorney involvement in law reform and attorney
support for clients addressed in this Article is somewhat different than what
appears to be the primary situation addressed in Rule 6.4. Rule 6.4 seems
aimed at lawyers serving on city councils, on school boards, in state
legislatures, on planning commissions, and in similar situations in which the
lawyer is part of a relatively confined voting group subject to observation
and recording. By contrast, I am focusing in this Article on lawyer members
79. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.4 at 508 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2007)
("Not surprisingly, there are no reported decisions disciplining a lawyer for violating the operative part
of Rule 6.4. Two ethics opinions, both dealing with adoption reform, do make use of Rule 6.4.").
80. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 93-176
(1993) (stating an attorney may form an organization of adoption lawyers with the goal of influencing
adoption legislation); Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Conduct, Advisory Op. 91-27 (1992)
(providing where assistant state's attorney may in his capacity as president of a genealogical
organization, petition the legislature to change law regarding access to birth records even though the
county clerk, who is technically a client of the attorney, opposed the change).
81. The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance project, which developed during the 1980s
and early 1990s, featured significant participation and lobbying by attorneys representing businesses
seeking more favorable rules for incumbent corporate management in the document. See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Hard Battles Over Soft Law: The Substantive and Political Implications of Controversy
Surrounding the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance 22
(July 31, 2019) [hereinafter Stempel, HardBattles OverSoft Lax] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
82. See Elizabeth Laposata et al., supranote25, at5 (arguing the Tobacco Institute and its
lawyers influenced the Restatement principles, which "demonstrates the ALI's failings . .. [and] its
Restatements cannot be viewed as unbiased authoritative documents.").
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of the ALI, a bar association rules revision committee, or even a judicial task
force/study commission or the full bar association.
In this latter group of situations, the attorney is part of a much larger
group where votes are not recorded, and the law reform organization is
sufficiently large that press or community scrutiny of any one member is
unlikely. In the situations addressed in this Article, the attorney member is
not one of a select group of decisionmakers but instead is attempting to
influence a select group of decisionmakers (e.g., Reporter of a Restatement,
the ALI Council). If the attorney's efforts stem from the attorney's personal
analysis of a legal issue, the participation-even if extremely slanted in favor
of a particular stakeholder interested in the outcome-falls within the zone
of good faith participation in the law reform endeavor. But if the lawyer's
activity is part of billable client retention or an attorney or law firm
marketing effort, the lawyer's participation becomes excessively and
impermissibly partisan.
B. OrganigationalAttempts to Control Member Partisanshjo: The ALI Example
Law reform organizations are not blind to the problem. The ALI, for
example, has in its various rules and procedures several admonitions against
lobbying the organization on behalf of a client, including an entire Conflict
of Interest Policy which encompasses both direct economic interest (e.g.,
possible benefit from a business relationship with ALI) and conflicts based
on client interests." There is also a set of rules applicable to the Directors
and Reporters that cautions them to "perform their responsibilities with the
objectivity expected of legal scholars" and to "exercise sensitivity to the risk
and appearance of conflict of interest in their work for the Institute."8 4 This
Policy Statement states that a "risk or appearance of a conflict of interest
arises when formulation of text, Comment, or Illustration could advance a
83. See AM. LAW INST., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST POLICY 11 (2009), https://www.ah.org/
media/filer_public/5d/b7/5db71e75-62a8-43b1-956c-98a4854d72f9/conflictspolicy.pdf (a opted by
resolution of the Council on Oct. 23, 2009) ("the participation of an officer or Council member in the
consideration of an ALI project should be based on personal and professional experience and
conviction, without seeking to advance the economic, political, or client interest of the officer or
Council member or of his or her clients, family members [defined as grandparents, grandchildren, or
closer], or other persons with whom the officer or Council member has a business, institutional, or
other relationship.").
84. AM. LAW INST., POLICY STATEMENT AND PROCEDURES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
WITH RESPECT TO INSTITUTE PROJECTS B. 1 (2010), https://www.ali.org/media/filer-public/13/6
e/136e2528-3be7-4b65-beb0-9d59f5c7b403/conflicts-of-interest-with-respect-to-institute-projects.
pdf (approved by the Council on May 16, 1994, and amended by the Council on May 17, 2010.)
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position taken by the Director or Reporter in another engagement on an
issue within the scope of a pending Institute project."5 In addition:
Members of an Advisory Committee, a Members Consultative Group, and
the Council should observe the policies stated [in Paragraph B.1] of these
procedures ... [and] should observe the policies of Rule 6.4 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct when discussing proposals for change
in the language of a draft. 6
Most prominent of the ALI admonitions is perhaps Rule 4.03 of the
ALI's Rules of Council regarding Obligations of Institute Members. The
Rule provides:
[i]n communications made within the framework of institute proceedings,
members should speak, write, and vote on the basis of their personal and
professional convictions and experience without regard to client interests or
self-interest. It is improper for a member to represent a client in Institute
proceedings and such conduct constitutes good cause for termination of
Institute membership under Rule 5.02. If, in the consideration of Institute
work, a member's statements can be properly assessed only if the client
interests of the member or the member's firm are known, the member should
make appropriate disclosure, but need not identify clients.8 7
The ALI conflicts rules have been criticized as weaker than that of other
organizations, but the ALI rules are hardly insubstantial. Fairly applied,
these rules would appear to prohibit members from acting as undisclosed
paid advocates for insurers, policyholders, or other interest groups before
the ALI and would also appear to bar undisclosed marketing or client
development efforts by members in their participation in ALI projects such
as the RLLI.
85. AM. LAW INST., POLICY STATEMENT AND PROCEDURES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
WITH RESPECT TO INSTITUTE PROJECTS B. 2 (2010), https://www.a.org/media/fler-pubhc/13/6
e/136e2528-3be7-4b65-beb0-9d59f5c7b403/conficts-of-interest-with-respect-to-institute-projects.
pdf (approved by the Council on May 16, 1994, and amended by the council on May 17, 2010); see also
AM. LAW INST., supra note 83, at 2 (noting "[t]he risk and appearance ofconflict are most likely to arise
from engagements that involve legal advice, opinions, expert testimony, or participation in briefing,
argument, or the development oflegal strategy.").
86. Id. at 8 (approved by the Council on May 16, 1994 and amended by the council on May 17,
2010).
87. AM. LAW INST., RULES OF COUNCIL 4.03 (2007), https://www.ali.org/
media/filerpublic/fe/85/fe85ca3f-df50-4103-a745-631147c90c4d/council-rule-403.pdf (as adopted
in May 2007; last amended as of May 18, 2016) [hereinafter RULES OF COUNCIL 4.03].
2020] 275
ST. MARY'SJOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICEcfrETHICS [Vol.10:244
What is lacking, however, is a degree of compulsion in these ALI
procedures. Members are essentially subject to an imprecise honor code in
which the members call their own balls and strikes. One need not be a cynic
to expect that such a regime will not produce a great deal of voluntary
disclosure, let alone recusal or restraint in advocating positions that may aid
a client (perhaps at the expense of another client). As discussed below, the
situation requires not only more awareness of the problem, but also
stronger, less discretionary rules aimed at reducing conflicts of interest and
bringing those that cannot be eliminated into the sunshine.
IV. ATTACKS ON THE ALI LIABILITY INSURANCE RESTATEMENT
AS AN ILLUSTRATION
Aspects of the debate regarding the RLLI reflect the problem of
involvement in law reform by attorneys who are quite aware of the
consequences of proposed law reform for their respective firms and clients.
The RLLI began as a "Principles" project in 2010 and was converted to a
Restatement in 2014." Along the way, it has garnered increasing attention
88. Restatements, of course, are well known to law students and lawyers because of the
popularity of the Restatement of Contracts and the Restatement of Torts, both of which are frequently
cited in judicial opinions and are often reprinted (at least in part) in materials assigned for law school
classes. A Restatement is designed to collect and synthesize the law of a given area. In addition to
Torts and Contracts, the ALI has published Restatements regarding judgments, Conflict of Laws,
Foreign Relations, and other areas of law. The format for a Restatement is that of "black letter"
sections setting for a Rule, followed by Comments and Illustrations, followed by the Reporter's Note,
which is something of a mini-treatise collecting caselaw regarding the black letter sections and
commentary.
Restatements were among the first projects undertaken by the ALI, which was formed in 1925
by prominent lawyers, judges, and academics seeking improvement of American law. The Institute's
leadership has been and continues to be a "Who's Who" of American Law and includes luminaries,
such as Columbia Professors Herbert Wexler and Lance Liebman, Yale and Penn Law Professor
Geoffrey Hazard, NYU Law Dean Richard Revesz, former ABA President Roberta Cooper Ramo,
and noted judges Louis Brandeis, Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, Lee Rosenthal and David Levy.
Membership is by election and is limited to 3,000 persons (there were 2,812 elected members as of
May 2017). In addition to producing the Restatements and Principles projects, the ALI promulgates
model statutes and conducts continuing legal education programs.
A Principles project is distinguished from a Restatement in that the former is less tethered to
existing law and has greater freedom to adopt an approach regarded as superior, even if such an
approach lacks support in existing law or has even been rejected by courts. However, a Restatement
need not adopt as a rule only positions embraced by the majority of courts. The ALI discussed its
process quite loquently in the ALI's Revised Style Manual (Jan. 2015), a portion of which regarding
the "Nature of a Restatement" is excerpted at the beginning of the current Draft of the RLLI.
Summarizing, the Institute noted "Restatements are primarily addressed to courts. They aim at clear
formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently
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and opposition from the insurance industry, as reflected by industry efforts
to derail the project and to label any resulting document as unduly pro-
policyholder. The criticism is overblown, if not entirely incorrect. The
stands or might appropriately be stated by a court." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. at x
(AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 2 Apr. 3, 2018) (boldface removed). A Restatement rule
should have at least some support in caselaw but need not be the majority rule. Rather, in examining
the legal landscape, the ALI may embrace the judicial approach viewed as superior even if it is the
minority rule, even a distinct minority.
A Restatement hus assumes the perspective of a common-law court, attentive to and respectful
of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is inappropriate or inconsistent with the law as a
whole. Faced with such precedent, an Institute Reporter is not compelled to adhere to what
[former ALI Director and Columbia University law professor] Herbert Wechsler called "a
preponderating balance of authority" but is instead expected to propose the better rule and
provide the rationale for choosing it. A significant contribution of the Restatements has also
been anticipation of the direction in which the law is tending and expression ofthat development
in a manner consistent with previously established principles.
The Restatement process contains four principal elements. The first is to ascertain the nature of
the majority rule. If most courts faced with an issue have resolved it in a particular way, that is
obviously important to the inquiry. The second step is to ascertain trends in the law. If
30 jurisdictions have gone one way, but the 20 jurisdictions to look at the issue most recently
went the other way, or refined their prior adherence to the majority rule, that is obviously
important as well. Perhaps the majority rule is now widely regarded as outmoded or undesirable.
If Restatements were not to pay attention to trends, the ALI would be a roadblock to change,
rather than a "law reform" organization. A third step is to determine what specific rule fits best
with the broader body of law and therefore leads to more coherence in the law. And the fourth
step is to ascertain the relative desirability of competing rules. Here social-science evidence and
empirical analysis can be helpful.
Nature ofa Restatement, repinted in RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. at x-xi (AM. LAW INST.,
Proposed Final Draft No. 2 Apr. 3, 2018).
Where a Restatement adopts a minority rule or modified or hybrid rule or expresses some
creativity in attempting to improve the law as well as to synthesize it, this is not disregarding the law
but simply a recognition that "what a Restatement can do that a busy common-law judge, however
distinguished, cannot is engage the best minds in the profession over an extended period of time, with
access to extensive research, testing rules against disparate fact patterns in many jurisdictions." Id. at xi.
Ironically, when insurers have complained about an RLLI draft by stating that an RLLI position
will damage insurance markets, cause substantial increases in premiums, make insurance less available
or the like, they have done so without marshalling empirical evidence. But insurers are the entities with
the greatest access to underwriting, claims,loss, pricing, and profitability information-much of which
is proprietary and not available to scholars or the general public, including the ALI. Such deafening
silence in this regard seriously undermines insurance industry claims about deleterious impact from the
RLLI-or for that matter any legal rule insurers regard as favoring policyholders. Ifapro-policyholder
rule actually does adversely affect the insurance business or the fortunes of insurers, the insurance
industry should be able to produce at least some evidence in support of this contention.
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RLLI reflects mainstream approaches to insurance issues." Several of the
provisions, in fact, take demonstrably pro-insurer positions, and the
document as a whole is not unduly slanted to either policyholders or
insurers. Despite this, many insurers, and lawyers representing insurers,
have attacked the RLLI with an antipathy normally reserved for third-world
dictators.
In addition to the formal process of distributing and discussing drafts
within the Institute, the ALI maintains a record of the Restatements and
projects on its website, to which both members and non-members may post
comments. The RLLI was subject to more than 200 comments' and more
than thirty-five motions regarding portions of the drafts.92
As is typically the case with Restatements, after meeting with Advisers
and the Members Consultative Group (MCG), the RLLI Reporters revised
the then-current draft and presented a "Council Draft" to the ALI Council,
which reviews, discusses, and then votes upon the Restatement sections
89. See generally JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE 14A.02,14A.04 (4th ed. 2016 & Annual Supps) (describing political and
jurisprudential battles surrounding the RLLI and assessing its provisions, concluding that the RLLI as
a whole reflects mainstream legal doctrine). I have been one of the Advisers on the RLLI (there were
roughly forty others as well so this is hardly deep "insider" status), and consequently may be affected
by what cognitive scientists might term confirmation bias (looking at the world with an unconscious
desire to have perceived empirical evidence validate one's pre-existing opinion) or status quo bias
(having an ingrained preference for the current state of affairs) (although this is not quite apt because
the RLLI did not become the formally adopted status quo of the ALI until 2019, after my participation
ended. But the ALI and its Restatements are to some extent the status quo in U.S. law). Despite this,
I think my analysis of the RLLI and its relation to existing insurance law is empirically accurate and
generally in accord with those of major treatises, including those written by policyholder and insurer
counsel.
90. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Anaytic"Ga": The Perils of Relentless Enforcement of Payment-
by-Underlying-Insurer-Ony Language in Excess Insurance Polies, 52 TORT,TRIAL & INS. L.J. 807, 808 (2017)
(criticizing RLLI 39's treatment of attachment of excess liability insurance policies where underlying
limit satisfied by policyholder payments rather than payment by underlying insurer); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Enhaning the Socally Instrumental Role of Insurance: The Ofportuniy and Challenge Presented by the AL
Restatement Position on Breach of the Duy to Defend, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 587,592 (2015) (urging adoption
of earlier draft of RLLI section regarding remedy for breach of the duty to defend that was revised to
favor insurers in final version of RLLI).
91. See STEMPEL& KNUTSEN, sura note 89, at 14A.01 n.10. Between January 1, 2014 and
July 15, 2017, there were 231 comments submitted regarding the RLLI. Stempel, HardBattles OverSoft
Lax, supra note 81, at 28 n.61. Comments submitted prior to 2014 have not been retained on the
website. In addition, persons interested in the RLLI frequently make direct contact with the Reporters
but do not send their comments to the ALI for posting. But whatever the final tally, it is clear that the
RLLI has received substantial scrutiny and commentary.
92. See STEMPEL& KNUTSEN, supra note 89, at 14A.01n.11. The Project Page for RLLI was
taken down after final approval of the document, but motions remain on file with the ALI.
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before it. The RLLI was discussed at five different Council meetings
between 2012 and 2018.9' After approval by the Council, the relevant
portions of a Restatement are put before the ALI membership at its Annual
Meeting. Meetings are held in May, with roughly three-fourths of the
meetings in Washington and the rest being held in San Francisco to facilitate
the attendance of members residing in the West.
At the Annual Meeting, Restatement provisions are discussed seriatim
before those on the floor, and members are permitted to offer amendments
and commentary. Votes are taken on the proposed amendments, while the
Reporters generally consider commentary for potential editorial changes
after the Meeting. The proceedings are transcribed and published by the
Institute, which provides something of a legislative history regarding review
of a restatement. "The RLLI was subject to discussion at the 2012, 2013,
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 Annual Meetings, with final approval at
the May 2018 Annual Meeting."9 4  The RLLI was formally published in
September 2019.
During its development, many hours of lawyering were devoted to attacks
on the RLLI.9 s Much of the anti-RLLI commentary could fairly be
described as "trashing" the project rather than reasoned commentary
examining its specific provisions.9 6 The bulk of this appears to have come
from non-members who are not technically bound by the obligations to the
organization or the norms of the organization. Some of the non-members
who engaged in an inappropriate commentary (either as commentators or
orchestrators of the commentary) were attorneys, which implicates
professional responsibility concerns. Lawyers are not only client advocates,
but also officers of the court who are subject to a web of rules 9 7mandating
that their activity be fair, reasonable, and nondeceptive.
93. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 89, at 14A.01 (describing, at some length,
controversy surrounding the RLLI and the nature and volume of commentary submitted to the ALI).
94. Id.
95. Seegenerally id. at 14A.04 (discussing the insurance industry's opposition to the RLLI and
observing insurers produced most of the commentary and criticism surrounding the RLLI).
96. See id. (explaining oppositional attacks, stating the RLLI was "greatly at odds with American
law.").
97. See 28U.S.C. 1927 (2018) (providing for sanctions where attorney arguments are
sufficiently unfounded and deemed to be vexatious); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring claims and
contentions have evidentiary and legal support); FED. R. APP. P. 28 (requiring the same for appellate
briefs); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) (requiring candor); Id.
at r. 3.4 (requiring fairness to opponents and others).
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Realizing that others may disagree, I regard a good deal of the criticism
of the RLLI from insurers or insurer affiliates9 8 as misplaced, misleading,
unfair, and unreasonable.9 9 To the extent attorneys were involved in such
lobbying (and it appears there was attorney involvement even in
commentary ostensibly made by laypersons or non-members),'oo ne may
legitimately ask whether such defective (even if effective)'' advocacy is
consistent with counsel's role as an officer of the court. Although law
reform organizations like the ALI are, of course, not literal courts, they are
respected expert bodies seeking to render determinations akin to those of
courts and may be more influential than many (probably most) court
decisions.1 02
In this Article (and in general), I am less concerned with the conduct of
lawyers who are not members of a law reform group and more worried that
lawyer members might too frequently succumb to client relations, business,
marketing, and affinity pressures that in turn will impact their participation
in law reform projects so that they are not truly independent advocates or
critics of a Restatement but instead become the functional equivalent of
lobbyists inside the temple.
Also problematic are situations where member attorneys of the law
reform organization engage in what might be termed "defective"
commentary (in that, for example, it is misleading, exaggerated, istorts the
truth, or invokes crisis rhetoric without basis). Although attorney attacks
on RLLI positions were less shrill and more reasoned than those of
laypersons and non-members, some of the commentary arguably sunk to
the defective level. 0 3
98. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, sura note 89, at 14A.04 (reviewing and responding to insurer
criticism of the RLLI); see also id. at 14A.07 n.275 ("Of the motions made regarding the RLL, the
vast majority have been made by insurers or affiliates. Of the comments made regarding the RLL,
more than 80 percent have been made by insurers or affiliates.").
99. See id. at 14A.04 (stating several reasons why criticism of the RLLI was inappropriate).
100. See id. at 14A.04[B][2] n.244 (describing an anti-RLLI letter written by a state regulator
that appears to have been heavily influenced, if not drafted, by counsel representing insurers opposing
the RLLI).
101. As exemplified by recent world politics, politicians may find exaggeration, hyperbole,
fearmongering, and falsehoods to be effective electoral tools for victory. But an attorney's use of such
tactics in litigation or lobbying violates a lawyer's duties to the legal system.
102. See Elizabeth Laposata et al., supra note 25, at 3-8 (noting prominence and influence of the
ALI).
103. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, sura note 89, at 14A.04 n.230 (providing an example of a
prominent attorney criticizing the RLLI as a clear warning shot for those in attendance). This is not
to say that the commentators-however much I dislike their style-are necessarily incorrect in their
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A particularly glaring example of defective commentary was the letter
signed by six governors that asserted promulgation of the RLLI
(2018 version) would wreak havoc with the economies of the states in
question (Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah). 0 4
Sadly, two of the signing governors (South Carolina's Hendry McMaster and
Greg Abbott of Texas) are attorneys, with Abbott being a former state
Supreme Court Justice.'os One would have hoped for more from this
group of powerful government officials. Additionally, some member
attorneys made comments or authored critiques outside the ALI process.
Some of these comments contain similar shortcomings.0 6
V. ATTEMPTING To AMELIORATE THE PROBLEMS OF CONFLICTED
LAW REFORM ADVOCACY
Drawing the line between what constitutes permissible law reform
advocacy and impermissible conflict of interest can be difficult. Enforcing
any standard that is not ludicrously lax (treating positional conflicts as
permissible) or ham-handedly harsh (barring private practitioners from
membership in a law reform organization or requiring recusal whenever a
client or potential client is affected by the group's activity) is at least as
difficult. Nonetheless, attorneys can take modest steps beyond the current
status quo to partially ameliorate the problem.
Oneeasylinetodrawisatthepoint of compensation and client retention.
An attorney should not open a file and bill a client for any attorney efforts
to make a law reform project (rules, restatement, proposed legislation) more
client-friendly or to thwart adoption of a law reform proposal. This practice
is simply inconsistent with the fair playground rules of a law reform
organization. It is not enough for an attorney to not bill the client for time
physically present at organizational meetings or similar organizational
functions yet bill the client for time or effort spent submitting comments,
making motions, lobbying other members in isolated communication, or
criticisms. But there is a "right" way and a "wrong" way of commentary and argumentation. The
former involves accurate portrayal of the provision under review and accurate presentation of facts,
precedent,law, and policy as well as measured assessment of any asserted detriments of a law reform
project asserted by the commenter. Many of the anti-RLLI commentary fell short of that standard,
and was misleading regarding the provisions at issue, prevailing law, and suggested impact if the
commentator's position was not accepted by the ALI.
104. See id. at 14A.07 n.268 (listinggovernors who signed the letter in opposition of the RLLI).
105. Id.
106. See id. at 14A.02 n.20 (providing examples).
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organizing efforts to impact law reform outcomes. Any attorney
compensation for this type of activity is improper and violates the norms of
the ALI as it would with similar organizations.
Using the RLLI again as an example: if the law firm of the member
attorney (Lawyer A) who is being compensated by insurers also represents
policyholder clients (even in a distant branch office) that will be harmed by
the "adverse precedent" of pro-insurer RLLI provisions sought by the
retained attorney, the law firm has a positional and material limitation
conflict. Similarly, if Lawyer A's efforts to obtain more pro-insurer content
of the RLLI are not part of a paid representation, but are part of a reasonably
ascertainable client development/marketing effort (as opposed to LawyerA
taking this on during evenings and weekends out of personal passion),0 7
Lawyer A's firm should not simultaneously be representing any
policyholders who would benefit from a different approach to the breach
of defense issue.os
In addition to presenting a classic positional conflict (albeit substituting
Restatement provisions for litigation), the sort of lobbying or marketing
activity described above also constitutes improper partisan participation in
that it cases the member in the role of a client (or prospective client)
advocate rather than a dispassionate, neutral member participating in good
faith in the organization's work.
Realistically, members of law reform organizations bring with them their
substantive views of law and policy, which are shaped by their experience.
A lawyer who has worked as coverage counsel for insurers for three decades
is unlikely to believe that policyholders need increased protection against
the avarice of insurers. A lawyer who has spent those same thirty years suing
insurers for bad faith is unlikely to believe in constricting such potential
liability.' 0 9 But the ability of these "partisans in practice" to engage in good
107. For example, if the law firm is providing LawyerA with associates and staff doing
significant work (e.g., a lengthy research memorandum designed to influence the ALI), this would, in
our view, be a sufficiently formal firm undertaking and client development effort that would be the
equivalent of paid work for a client. This undertaking should trigger a conflict of interest analysis, even
if there are not actual billings to an insurer client. Billed or not, these efforts would be adverse to Big
Firm's policyholder clients and are a conflict of interest.
108. It is also probably an impermissible conflict if Big Firm is representing claimants who
would benefit from the faster and more certain insurance coverage provided by a rule that precluded
coverage defenses when an insurer is in breach of the duty to defend.
109. To a large extent, however, a premise of law reform organizations is that members can set
aside the wishes of their clients or the economic interests of their practices and assess proposals fairly.
For example, an insurer's lawyer may by day assist clients by successfully arguing that an insurer can
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faith debate over draft Restatement provisions and comments or civil rules
reform should not be further hindered by permitting such lawyers to be
compensated for work with the law reform organization, or by the prospect
of generating business by showing fealty to one group of litigants.
The ALI has a rule in place (Rule 4.03) that sets essentially this exact
standard, but suffers from shortcomings.o"0 First, it could be more direct
and specific. Second, more structured disclosure and certification could
back the rule. Third, the rule needs more aggressive policing. Current
Rule 4.03 states that it is "improper for a member to represent a client in
Institute proceedings" but does not require certification of compliance with
the rule by the member."' Although a member tempted to violate the rule
might submit an untrue certification, taking an oath or making a similar
affirmation is generally accepted as having a sobering effect that increases
the likelihood that the person taking the oath will tell the truth and perform
an assigned duty.
Courts implicitly take this view by requiring that witnesses take an oath
or affirmation. The U.S. Congress takes a similar view, not only swearing
witnesses before a hearingbut also requiring witnesses to complete and sign
a form that seeks to identify possible conflicts and requires the witness to
acknowledge that materially false testimony constitutes perjury."12
have no bad faith liability in the absence of coverage (the doctrine in many states), but support an
organization proposal that does not impose this requirement, reasoning that even in the absence of
coverage, insurers may mistreat policyholders in a manner reflecting bad faith and entitling the
policyholder to a remedy.
110. RULES OF COUNCIL 4.03, supra note 87.
111. Id.
112. See Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form (on file with author). The Form requires the
witness to provide basic information, an advance copy of planned testimony, a resume, an
acknowledgment of perjury law, and list:
any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) related to the hearing's
subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current
calendar year and previous two calendar years. Include the source and amount of each grant or
contract ...
[as well as]
any contracts or payments originating with a foreign government and related to the hearing's
subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current
year and previous two calendar years. Include the amount and country of origin of each contact
or payment.
Disclosure Form at p. 1. See also Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XI ¶ 2 (g)( 5) (listing the
requirements of a witness appearing in open meetings and hearings).
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Although not a panacea, a certification requirement should discourage
conflicted or unduly partisan member participation at a relatively low cost.
The certification need not be onerous and could be as short as a single page
(the congressional form is two pages). Organization members could require
execution of the form regularly, before meetings where a matter is to be
discussed, and contemporaneously with any written comments
submitted.'13
Organizations should reject comments or motions unless a certification
accompanies them that the submitter has not been retained or compensated
by an interested party, nor has engaged in any activity before the law reform
group with the hope of gaining favor with clients or prospective clients. To
avoid such conflicts and violations of organization rules occurring sub silentio,
organizations like the ALI or the ABA could make it a required part of any
commentary or motion directed toward a Restatement that the
commentator or movant identify any client retention, compensation, client
development, or marketing initiative of the attorney that relates to the topic
of debate, comment or motion.'1
Alternatively, if lawyers "on the clock" are permitted to participate in a
group's law reform activity (either as members or non-members submitting
113. The form might look something like the following:
I, certify that my participation regarding [the organization work] is entirely due to
my individual and professional interest in the matter and that any views I express are solely my
own and are not designed to favor the interests of any clients or prospective clients of mine or
my law firm. I have received no remuneration from anyone that is in any way connected to my
participation and am not advancing positions or argument for the purpose of ingratiating myself
with any interest group or recruiting any possible clients.
114. For example, law reform organizations might require certification in addition to the type
discussed in the prior footnote as something of a "belt and suspenders" approach to puttingmembers
on notice of required behavior. Such a disclosure form might read as follows:
In approaching my participation in consideration of [the organization's work regarding a
particular topic or project], I disclose that my law practice involves representation of persons or
entities with an economic interest in the subject matter at issue. During the past five years,
approximately - percent of my time and _ percent of my income has come from these
persons or entities that can generally be described as [e.g., insurers, insurance
brokers, policyholders, stock brokers, labor unions, manufacturers, software companies, the
entertainment industry; law enforcement; criminal defendants].
Although this disclosure need not be articulated orally, having these disclosure forms submitted
and kept on file would likely have a disciplining impact on members and remind them of their duties
to the organization. In addition, the materials should be available-at least to other members as well
as to organization leadership-so that possible outside influences can be investigated.
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commentary or participating in discussion and debate), there should be a
certification that the attorney's law firm has performed a conflicts check that
includes an examination of possible positional conflicts and obtained
waivers where necessary if such waivers are permissible." 5
The certifications and disclosures of attorneys (both member and non-
member) should be available to the public. The ALI provides that
disclosures submitted by Reporters as to their engagements as consultants
are available "upon request" by the public, although "for confidentiality
reasons, parts of the disclosures may be redacted or withheld.""' This is
an improvement over the traditional norm of having Reporters on an honor
system or informal discussions regarding disclosure. The system can be
improved by placing this information, however redacted,"' 7 on the
organization's website" 8 -and certainly could be expanded to include all
the member and non-member commentators. In addition, where an
organization such as the ALI has sufficient influence on public policy,
posted commentary should be available for viewing by the public as well as
the membership.
To be sure, this would add a layer of bureaucracy to the process. But the
stakes are important, and the additional costs are not likely to be substantial,
even if the additional record-keeping may seem initially irritating to the
organization's staff. Further, lawyers should not view any required
disclosures or certifications as mere window-dressing or forgettable
paperwork. Greater knowledge about the background of commenters will
115. As a practicalmatter, a law reform organization cannot refuse to accept commentary from
individuals or groups interested in its work. But an organization can refuse to seriously consider
commentary if those submitting it fail to make requisite disclosures ofinterested clients and the terms
of their retention.
116. Laposata et al., suranote 25, at 52-54 (quoting AM. LAW INST., suranote 83).
117. The privacy concerns regarding some aspects of disclosure, particularly the more
comprehensive disclosure provided by Reporters as compared to members, are legitimate, which
requires care to avoid excessive redaction.
118. The ALI has already made significant strides in this direction in recent years. For example,
comments on a Restatement or Principles project are all posted to the project's website, which is
available for viewing by Institute members. The ALI also posts commentary directed to the ALI
through less formal means-such as comments submitted directly to the Director with the
understanding the commentary will be published. The "Six Governors" Letter (see sura notes 104-
105) is an example; the ALI has posted these for viewing.
A discerning reader can often ascertain the orientation of a commentator in that certain law firms
are known as plaintiffs' firms, defense firms and the like. But the more routinized disclosures and
certifications proposed in this Article would reduce uncertainty and provide more information for
assessing the commentary. Disclosure or certification forms could presumably be posted with the
commentary at relatively little additional expense.
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aid both law reform organizations and the public in assessing commentary
and determining the final form of Restatements, proposed rule changes,
model legislation, and the like.
One weakness of almost any disclosure regime is that it is unlikely to
adequately capture informal advocacy by interest groups and their lawyers
(whether members or not). Partisan lawyers and positionally conflicted
lawyers are unlikely to be deterred from pressing client or industry concerns
in phone calls, office visits, and side conversations during organization
events that, by their nature, are difficult to detect and make transparent to
outsiders. Although perhaps overkill, an organization like ALI should at
least consider whether Reporters and Council"' members should log and
make publicly available records of these informal contacts. It would be
more than a little interesting, for example, to know how many times insurer
advocates informally contacted RLLI Reporters relative to consumer
advocates. As previously noted, written comments on the RLLI were
dominated by insurer advocates, by a roughly 4:1 ratio.
Critics of current ALI policy have argued that it should adopt protocols
similar to those of the National Academy of Sciences ("NASD, National
Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM"'), and those of
the National Research Council.12 0 These groups appear to require both
broader and more broadly disseminated disclosure and forbid a wider range
119. Although the focus of critics of the ALI's disclosure regime has been Restatement
Reporters, see Laposata et al., supra note25, at26-27, 33-34, 36 (discussing tobacco industry
connections to Torts Restatement Reporters William Wade Prosser, Aaron Twerski, and James
Henderson), ALI Council members have power at least equal to and probably greater than most
Reporters.
The Reporters, of course, have a strong influence in designing and shaping the "first drafts" of
the various sections ofRestatements and Principles, as well as influence in setting the discussion agenda
with Advisers and the Members Consultative Group. But where a Restatement or Principles provision
is contentious, the work of the Reporters, even if solidly supported by the Advisers, receives close
scrutiny by the Council, a roughly sixty-member group of prominent judges, attorneys, and scholars
who may have their own views on the subject and are consistently concerned that the work of the
Reporters be well received by courts and the profession.
It is not unusual to have the Council make significant changes in the work of the Reporters. Less
common is a change in the Council's work by the Annual Meeting Membership. Under these
circumstances, whatever limits on Reporter behavior and whatever disclosures or certifications
required of Reporters should probably be required of Council members as well.
120. See id. at 55-59 (discussing the various safeguards the National Academies take to limit
impermissible influence on its members).
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of financial ties to interest groups affected by the work of the
organizations.121
The National Academies define "conflict of interest" as "any financial or
other interest which conflicts with the service of the individual because it
(1) could significantly impair the individual's objectivity or (2) could create an
unfair competitive advantage for any person or organization."
All members of NAS committees must fill out conflict of interest forms
that ask for specific information about their financial interests and
organizational affiliations upon appointment to a committee, and members
must also update these forms whenever any of their financial interests or
organizational affiliations change.12 2
The NAS conflicts policy appears closer to a bar, while that of the ALI is
more apolicy of (self-policing) disclosure with the view that the organization
will be able to aptly discount member advocacy that might be tainted by
conflicts or partisanship. The NAS disclosures apply more widely than
those of the ALI and include disclosure regarding spouses and relatives, as
well as requiring annual updates or updates upon changed conditions.123
Medical journal disclosures have also been suggested as an improvement
over ALI policy. These disclosures often require authors to reveal the
resources received from various sources that assisted in completing the
work as well as financial relationships that "[c]ould [b]e [p]erceived [t]o
[i]nfluence, or [g]ive [the] [a]ppearance of [i]nfluencing [s]ubmitted work"
as well as "[o]ther [r]elationships [t]hat [r]eaders [c]ould [p]erceive as
[h]aving [i]nfluenced, or [that] [g]ive [the] [a]ppearance of [i]nfluencing
[s]ubmitted [w]ork."1 24  Interestingly, the medical profession has, in
essence, embraced the "appearance of impropriety" as a type of conflict and
a topic of concern while the legal profession removed this ground of lawyer
andjudicial disqualification from its ethics codes during the 1980s.
121. See id. (creating required disclosures which ask that members who are involved in
developing guidelines for the organization disclose the "nature, scope, duration, and monetary value"
of ties to potential interest groups).
122. Id. at 55, 57.
123. See id. at 56 (comparing the policies of the NAS, IOM, and ALI regarding conflicts of
interest).
124. Id. at 60.
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This broader disclosure should be considered for law reform
organizations but may be excessive given the shifting nature of a practicing
lawyer's work and the episodic nature of academic consulting. On the
proverbial other hand, however, it makes sense to inform the audience of a
speaker's client or expert engagements. And it might be more than a little
interesting to know whether judge-members of a law reform organization
have been going to "educational" conferences ponsored by pro-plaintiff or
pro-defendant interest groups.
Although the ALI, perhaps because of the prominence of Restatements
and the notoriety brought by criticism of the tobacco industry influence on
the Torts Restatements, has been a focal point of concern about
politicization and member conflicts in advocacy, the problem is probably
more pronounced in other law reform organizations. The ALI may have
imperfect or insufficiently enforced conflict and neutrality rules, but many
state and local bar associations often have none. One may be a member of
a bar association or state supreme court committee without making any of
the disclosures suggested in this Article and may be an active litigator for
special interests impacted by committee work.
This is not to say that these committees, bar associations, or state courts
are necessarily deceived. In a sufficiently concentrated legal community,
organization or committee, members probably know a great deal about the
ideological orientation of members as well as their legal practices or other
sources of income and loyalty. That said, more stringent conflict
prohibition and disclosure policies should replace the informalities of the
organizations.
Rational analysis and debate that is unfettered by client interests and
pressures should form the basis of law reform so that groups like ALI do
not become the equivalent of a legislature beset upon by paid lobbyists.
Members will, of course, have views forged over years of practice, but active
formal representation or efforts to curry favor with an interest group at the
time of participation should not shape those views. Just as important,
members should not act in a manner violating the rules regarding conflict
of interest.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For too long, lawyers have soft-pedaled the dangers of positional conflicts
in general and largely ignored them in the context of law reform or similar
public policy activity involving attorneys. Similarly, law reform
organizations have been insufficiently vigilant in discouraging member
partisanship in an organization activity. Both pose significant risks.
The first problem endangers law firm clients-or at least the clients who
are on the short end of the stick when lawyers in the firm work to achieve
bar association rules, restatement pronouncements or the like that favor
other firm clients at the expense of the client who would prefer a different
legal landscape. Although such conflicts are probably waivable much of the
time pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), the firm client who is not getting the benefit
of the firm's law reform advocacy should at least be informed and provided
with the opportunity to consent-or seek the services of a law firm that
does not work against its interests.
For decades, if not centuries, lawyers have prided themselves-perhaps
too much-in a manner too inconsistent with the attorney desire to be seen
as lawyer-statesman. The pride is justified to the extent it enables counsel
to assess a claim clearly and dispassionately so that a client is well-served. It
may, for example, be much better for alawyer to counsel the client to quickly
settle a matter rather than being told that a claim merits vigorous defense
(and attendant billings). Flexibility, however, becomes betrayal when a law
firm argues for Rule A or Doctrine A on behalf of one client to the
detriment of other clients who would prefer that court reject Rule A and
Doctrine A.
The second problem poses a risk not so much to clients, but to law
reform organizations, the judiciary, and the public. Bar associations and
groups like the ALI should be confident that when members advance or
comment on organization work, they are doing so out of honest conviction,
rather than a desire to curry favor with existing or prospective clients.
Acceptance of any form of compensation in return for a member attorney's
attempts to sway the work of law reform organizations should disqualify an
attorney from future membership. Detection may be difficult, but this
requires increased vigilance rather than de facto acceptance.
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